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Zusammenfassung
O¨ffentliche Bibliotheken erfu¨llen seit langer Zeit eine Funktion von unscha¨tz-
barem Wert. Im Zeitalter digitaler Medien verlieren jedoch traditionelle
Methoden der Informationsverbreitung zunehmend an Bedeutung. Diese
Arbeit stellt die Frage, ob und wie Informationstechnologie genutzt werden
kann, um funktionelle Alternativen zu finden, die den durch eben diese In-
formationstechnologie vera¨nderten Bedu¨rfnissen der Gesellschaft gerecht wer-
den. Zu diesem Zweck fu¨hren wir das neue Konzept vonWeltbibliotheken ein:
Stark verteilte Systeme, die zur effizienten Verbreitung von großen Daten-
mengen in offenen, unsicheren Umgebungen geeignet sind und dabei die Pri-
vatspha¨re ihrer Nutzer schu¨tzen. Wir grenzen unsere Definition zuna¨chst
von a¨hnlichen Konzepten ab und motivieren ihren Nutzen mit philosophis-
chen, o¨konomischen und rechtlichen Argumenten. Dann untersuchen wir ex-
istierende anonyme file sharing-Systeme dahingehend, inwiefern sie als Im-
plementierungen von Weltbibliotheken geeignet sind. Dabei isolieren wir
Gru¨nde fu¨r den vergleichsweise geringen Erfolg dieser Gruppe von Program-
men und identifizieren Prinzipien und Strukturen, die in Weltbibliotheken
angewandt werden ko¨nnen. Eine solche Struktur von u¨bergeordneter Wichtig-
keit ist die sogenannte distributed hash table (DHT), deren Sicherheitseigen-
schaften, vor allem in Hinblick auf den Schutz der Privatspha¨re, wir daher
na¨her beleuchten. Mit Hilfe von analytischen Modellen und Simulation zeigen
wir Schwachstellen in bisher bekannten Systemen auf und stellen schließlich
die erste praktische DHT mit skalierbaren Sicherheitseigenschaften gegen ak-
tive Angreifer vor. Das vierte Kapitel der Arbeit widmet sich allgemeinen
Schranken der Anonymita¨t. Anonymita¨tstechniken stellen wichtige Mittel
zur Sicherung von Privatspha¨re dar. Wir untersuchen neuartige Angriffe
auf solche Techniken, die unter sehr allgemeinen Voraussetzungen einsetzbar
sind, und finden analytische untere Schranken fu¨r die Erfolgswahrschein-
lichkeit solcher Angriffe in Abha¨ngigkeit von der Anzahl der gegnerischen
Beobachtungen. Dies beschra¨nkt die Anwendbarkeit von Anonymita¨tstech-
niken in Weltbibliotheken und anderen privacy enhancing technologies. Ab-
schließend fassen wir unsere Erkenntnisse und ihre Auswirkungen auf die
Gestaltung von Weltbibliotheken zusammen.
Abstract
Public libraries have served an invaluable function for a long time. Yet in
an age of digital media, traditional methods of publishing and distributing
information become increasingly marginalized. This thesis poses the ques-
tion if and how information technology can be employed to find functional
alternatives, conforming to the needs of society that have been changed by
information technology itself. To this end we introduce the concept of world
libraries: Massively distributed systems that allow for the efficient sharing
of large data volumes in open, untrusted environments while preserving pri-
vacy. To begin with, we discuss our definition as it relates to similar but
different notions, then defend its utility with philosophical, economical, and
legal arguments. We go on to examine anonymous file sharing systems with
regard to their applicability for world libraries. We identify reasons why
these systems have failed to achieve popularity so far, as well as promising
principles and structures for successful world library implementations. Of
these, distributed hash tables (DHTs) turn out to be particularly important.
That is why we study their security and privacy properties in detail. Us-
ing both analytical models and simulation, weaknesses in earlier approaches
are shown, leading us to the discovery of the first practical DHT that scal-
ably defends against active adversaries. The fourth chapter is dedicated to
general bounds on anonymity. Anonymity techniques are important tools
for the preservation of privacy. We present novel attacks that endanger the
anonymity provided by these tools under very general circumstances, giving
analytical lower bounds to the success probability of such attacks measured
in the number of adversarial observations. These results limit the applica-
bility of anonymity techniques in world library implementations and other
privacy enhancing technologies. Finally, we summarize our findings and their
impact on world library design.
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Chapter 1
World Libraries
The Tao of heaven is like the bending of a bow.
The high is lowered, and the low is raised.
If the string is too long, it is shortened;
If there is not enough, it is made longer.
The Tao of heaven is to take from those who have too much
and give to those who do not have enough.
Man’s way is different.
He takes from those who do not have enough
and gives to those who already have too much.
What man has more than enough and gives it to the world?
Only the man of Tao.
Therefore the sage works without recognition.
He achieves what has to be done without dwelling on it.
He does not try to show his knowledge.
[50, verse 77]
1.1 Introduction and Overview
It is difficult to deny that knowledge is a strategic asset in postmodern so-
cieties. We have all heard of the emergence of an information age, and one
might be inclined to believe that the importance of this asset is growing when
compared to other values such as physical strength or land. It can then be
argued that distributing information equally with respect to social status is
tantamount to ensuring equal opportunities for all members of a society, be
it for self expression or economic welfare. For generations, it has been a
hallmark of modern civilizations to increasingly decouple media access from
income. Public libraries have been a popular means to this end. Yet we
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will argue that institutions like this, that have been successfully employed
to help make culture a public good in developed societies, are in danger of
being rendered ineffective.
The advent of the digital computer, the Internet, the World Wide Web,
and finally file sharing networks such as Napster have made tangible and
obvious a very basic computer science tenet: the division between signal and
message, the independence of content from physical media. Information has
become infinitely divisible and cheaply distributable. Ironically, it is precisely
this property of information that now endangers its dissemination through
libraries. Libraries1 are institutions that have been designed to hold and
give access to media in physical form. Since content, and thus knowledge, is
increasingly produced, transmitted, and stored independently from any fixed
media it is not clear how libraries are to deal with this situation. For example,
the exclusive perusal model of libraries is natural for physical copies, yet hard
to justify or even implement for digital data. Hence, an increasing volume of
newly generated or newly transformed information will never reach a public
library. This thesis asks how the objectives that the public library served
in an age dominated by books and physical media can be attained when
concrete physical media representations become cheaply interchangeable in
information storage, distribution, and consumption. To this end, in this
chapter we propose, define, and motivate the concept of a world library as
a massively distributed system that allows for the efficient sharing of large
data volumes in open, untrusted environments while preserving privacy.
While we cannot claim to have built an actual world library, the remaining
chapters in this book illustrate the complexities of its realization. We begin
by surveying existing “anonymous file sharing” systems that can be seen as
early prototypes of world libraries, because anonymity is one mechanism that
can be used to preserve privacy. In particular, we will analyze in some depth
the Owner-Free File System (OFF), a community effort that embraces an
unorthodox approach in both philosophy and technology—thereby straying
from the “anonymous file sharing” dogma and prefiguring the concept of
world libraries that we propose in this thesis. Since we deal with legacy
systems here, we employ methods from practical computer science—chiefly
experiments and program analysis—along with a more history-of-technology
oriented approach that tries to read artifacts as sources according to the
question why these systems did not succeed.
One of the key points that arises repeatedly in Chapter 2 is the inherent
1We use the term library in this real-world, commonplace meaning without definition.
It will merely serve us as a metaphor to illustrate our motivation. Simply imagine a public
library of your choosing, a place where media can be stored and perused.
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difficulty of constructing, analyzing, and understanding complex secure dis-
tributed systems like world libraries. We therefore suggest to assemble such
systems out of simple and well-understood building blocks that are powerful
enough to inherit their security properties to the world library. One such
key element is the distributed hash table (DHT) or structured peer-to-peer
(P2P) network. It is of particular relevance because unstructured networks
exhibit severe weaknesses both in performance and security, as we observe in
Chapter 2. On that account, in Chapter 3 we examine security and privacy
relevant properties of these often-used structures. We give both theoretical
analysis and simulation results that motivate implementation choices.
From a yet more theoretical perspective, we look at general limits to
anonymity in Chapter 4. Using tools from the analysis of algorithms and
learning theory, we identify and quantify the effect of novel attacks on a very
generic class of anonymity techniques. Among other uses, these findings
should in our opinion be considered when designing world libraries.
In the concluding chapter we summon the threads. After reviewing our
contributions, we collect the lessons learnt in the earlier chapters among other
considerations into an open list of requirements, principles, issues, rationales,
and ideas for designing world libraries. This section draws its inspiration
from software engineering methods for requirements engineering, analysis,
and design, such as Issue-based Modeling [45]. In a short outlook we comment
on the status quo of world libraries, and suggest future work opportunities.
1.2 Definition and Related Concepts
Let us begin by defining what exactly we mean by the term world library.
While library refers to the metaphor of a public library, a place where doc-
uments are collected and can be perused, the world qualifier suggests some
expansion in scope. That is, we wish to convey a connotation that brings to
mind a rethinking of the ancient concept of a public library into the digital
age, expanded to global scale. This expansion entails physical and organ-
isational distribution and poses questions of realization for both technical
components— like storage, search, and delivery—and responsibilities— like
ownership, content selection, and publishing. As the subtitle of this thesis
suggests, we might begin with a definition like this:
Definition 1 A world library is a massively distributed system that allows
for the efficient sharing of large data volumes in an open untrusted environ-
ment while preserving privacy.
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Obviously, this definition is not mathematically formal, and it cannot be
since we are describing a class of potential real-world systems. Nonetheless,
we may make this definition more precise by explaining its components and
motivating their presence in the definition:
• A massively distributed system [129] is a peer-to-peer overlay computer
network that scales to very large amounts of participating nodes, say,
millions to billions. We aim to use the existing and evolving network
structure and resources of the Internet. By providing incentive for pri-
vate and institutional node owners to participate, we hope to leverage
technical resources, content, and user intelligence in order to build a
library that is valuable to its users. This economic principle of increas-
ing usefulness by mass participation in a self-energizing cycle lies at the
heart of many peer-to-peer applications that have been emerging in the
last decade (cf. [100]), but can be traced back far beyond the inception
of the Internet, with the Web 2.0 or crowd-sourcing trend a more re-
cent example. For such a system to be self-supporting, this principle
presupposes usefulness for every participant, and this aspect will at
the same time motivate and enable some of the remaining properties
of world libraries, in particular the following one.
• In this context, we want efficient to be understood as a placeholder for
nonfunctional requirements such as high data throughput, fast response
times, reliability, security, or more generally usability in practice. This
includes engineering and social aspects such as simplicity, user interface
design, or socially accepted motivation, and rules out purely theoretical
approaches as well as approaches that have failed in the past. We will
look at some of these in Chapter 2.
• By sharing we denote the functional capability to publish, maintain
or store, find, and retrieve documents in a distributed manner. At
this point we leave open the question if this is better done by simply
exchanging documents that are stored at the publisher’s computer or
by first storing them in some form elsewhere. Implementation details
like this are relegated to the more technical chapters.
• Large data volumes imply both a great number of documents and doc-
uments that contain a large amount of data. While the first point is
natural in a library, let alone one of global scope, the second stems from
the increasing trend towards data intensive multimedia documents such
as video.
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• An open untrusted environment is characterized by spontaneous and
ongoing joining and leaving of nodes (so-called node churn) that have
to be treated as potential adversaries at least up to a certain fraction,
and the absence of a trusted third party. To our mind, this is the only
model that is able to capture a truly scalable and accessible library
under the realities of the Internet today, while avoiding the technical,
political, and legal dangers of a centralized authority (single point-of-
failure, single point-of-attack, censorship opportunity etc.).
• Preserving privacy means making it hard for attackers to associate
user identities with user behavior. This point is of central importance
to our concept and this thesis and is therefore separately motivated in
Section 1.3.1.
The world library concept has clearly been prefigured by a number of
similar but distinct notions. In order to justify the need for a new term and
definition, we therefore differentiate these related notions from ours.
1.2.1 Digital Libraries
DELOS, “a Network of Excellence on Digital Libraries partially funded by
the European Commission” [37] defines a digital library as “An organisation,
which might be virtual, that comprehensively collects, manages and preserves
for the long term rich digital content, and offers to its user communities
specialised functionality on that content, of measurable quality and according
to codified policies.” [47]. At first glance, this bears striking similarity to our
concept of a world library, and indeed, DELOS shares our vision “That all
citizens, anywhere, anytime, should have access to Internet-connected digital
devices to search all of human knowledge, regardless of barriers of time,
place, culture or language (. . . )” [37]. To a closer look, the above definition,
however, reveals a strong focus on organisation, in contrast to technology.
In fact, the many digital libraries existing today are distinct organizational
efforts with a clear ownership, even though some of them, like “The Open
Library” [99] and in particular “Google Book Search” [59] are very large in
scale. These two libraries also exemplify some of the problems that the digital
library approach faces: At the time of writing, The Open Library is featuring
22,845,290 books, but only 1,064,822 of them are available in full text. This
is because due to licensing pressures, only works in the public domain can
be read online. Google faces a similar problem, and has just recently been
sued by a large number of publishers for making available mere parts of their
books. While Google has the means to buy their way out of these accusations,
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they do not have an incentive nor the possibilities to make available the full
text of most of the millions of books they scanned. Moreover, Google is a
commercial enterprise that needs to refinance even the limited service they
can offer through advertising and similar business models, a behavior that
most people would not expect from their public library.
To summarize, by relying on organisations, instead of a loose peer-to-
peer network of unrelated participants, cost problems and legal issues arise
that grow larger with the scope of the digital library and could only be
solved if the organisations were to scale globally as well. Our alternative
technological approach aims to avoid the problems of large organizations by
distributing the load to spontaneously volunteering nodes. In the process,
legal issues can also be distributed because there is no single entity that
can be held responsible. Instead, each user carries the responsibility for the
works he contributes or downloads. In Section 1.3, together with one more
example of a digital library, we provide additional rationale for our differing
approach. Later on in that section, after introducing our main motivation
of privacy protection, we discuss social and legal implications of the above-
mentioned distribution of responsibility. As a side note, organized digital
libraries introduce some nontrivial privacy issues as well.
1.2.2 Tor and Other Low-Latency
Anonymity Networks
Tor [41], the onion router, is a low-latency anonymity network that can be
used to anonymize various Internet protocols including HTTP, SMTP, and
many more. One of its possible uses is hiding the users’ identity to web
servers while browsing websites. There is even the possibility of offering so-
called hidden services that might be employed to publish data anonymously.
While Tor has been very successful, with an estimated several hundred thou-
sand users at the time of writing, there are some downfalls when following the
obvious idea of using this technology in the place of a world library: Firstly,
Tor traffic is routed through several volunteering servers (nodes). Their num-
ber is below 2000 at the time of writing. This severely limits the amount of
traffic that the network is able to route for its clients and therefore practi-
cally excludes its use for bandwidth intensive tasks such as file sharing. New
designs that strive for a stricter implementation of the peer-to-peer paradigm
where every client is also a server have been proposed, yet have not reached
Tor’s popularity so far, for a number of technical and social reasons that are
out of scope here. Secondly, there have been many successful attacks on the
anonymity of Tor reported in the literature (e.g. [5, 57, 101, 90, 65]), and
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hidden services are especially in danger. Attacks similar to those described
in Chapter 4 might pose a particular threat, unless a hidden service were
to often change their location. Therefore, even if a comparable low-latency
anonymity network could be made to scale against the high bandwidth needs
of world library type applications, it is questionable if this kind of design
could be used to preserve privacy for publishers in the long run. Tor has
been designed with a very different objective in mind. It is both too gen-
eral—e.g., because it supports anonymization for a large group of protocols
— and too specific—because it compromises anonymity in exchange for low
latency—to be effectively used as a world library. As the most successful
anonymity network deployed today, however, Tor can inspire a number of
best practices, such as their mantra of “anonymity loves company” [40]: Any
anonymity network needs to be highly usability oriented—or, in the lan-
guage of our definition, efficient—because popularity increases anonymity
set size (see Chapter 4), which in turn improves anonymity.
1.2.3 Censorship Resistant Publishing,
Anonymous Storage, and Freenet
Around the turn of the millennium, a number of censorship resistant publish-
ing networks including Publius [80], Tangler [135], and Dagster [130] have
been proposed. As the category term suggests, their focus is on protec-
tion against censorship. This leads to their assumption of very powerful
adversaries like national states. Though some of these systems have actually
been built, they have found little adoption. One of the reasons might be
that their strong adversarial model affects practical usability. Anonymous
storage services like The Eternity Service [2], Archival Intermemory [56], or
Free Haven [39] sacrifice even more efficiency for their vision of eternally
stored documents. Finally, Freenet [25] is a comparatively popular existing
system that tries to build a web-like structure with strong encryption and
anonymization measures and distributed document storage. We have sorted
it in this group because its goals are comparable to the above systems in that
it tries to defend against any kind of censorship and eavesdropping by pos-
sibly very powerful attackers. In particular, Freenet’s philosophy explicitly
accepts the abuse of the system for socially unacceptable practices like child
pornography in exchange for a radical protection of users’ freedom of speech.
Not only is this a controversial point of view, but in Freenet’s case it also en-
tails reduced usability because the degree of indirection and encryption used
leads to very low data rates and unpredictable data availability. These fac-
tors contribute to low user rates, which in turn violates the requirement that
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“anonymity loves company”. Of course, the Freenet developers are aware of
these problems, and have redesigned the system to incorporate elements like
trusted friends and tunable security parameters from version 0.7 on. Still, in
a recent trial, we did not succeed in downloading a single page from Freenet.
Elements of the Freenet architecture reappear in GNUnet (cf. 2.2).
While in Section 2.3 we will reencounter the idea of entanglement or
multi-use data that is central in Dagster and Tangler, our focus is more on
practical use in combination with privacy protection against local adversaries.
We motivate this choice in Section 1.3.
1.2.4 Private Information Retrieval
and Oblivious Transfer
Private information retrieval (PIR) [19] is a theoretical computer science
concept that addresses the problem of accessing a distributed database with-
out giving away to any server the exact query. Oblivious transfer (OT) [107]
is a related concept where a sender transmits some information to a receiver,
but remains oblivious as to what is received. While both PIR and OT could
serve as valuable building blocks in a world library, they are very general the-
oretical constructs, which introduces obstacles to such a proposal: Although
many solutions to these problems have been devised, researchers are still
struggling to make any of these practically usable. This is firstly because
many of these solutions employ complex algorithms that are efficient only
asymptotically, and secondly because these general concepts fail to immedi-
ately address practical issues such as searching or denial-of-service attacks.
Hence, we do not believe that anytime soon, a practical approach to these
problems is going to trivialize the creation of world libraries.
1.2.5 Anonymous File Sharing
Although the file sharing phenomenon has farther-reaching roots, it came to
prominence with the rise of Napster (cf. [100]) and inspired the emergence
of the peer-to-peer paradigm. One might reasonably classify modern file
sharing networks as massively distributed systems that allow for the efficient
sharing of large data volumes, thus mirroring a large part of our world library
definition. In fact, when we add the extra requirement of preserving privacy,
we might think of anonymous file sharing as a solution to the problem. This
is why we examine some anonymous file sharing networks as precursors of
world libraries in Chapter 2. Still, we find the notion of anonymous file
sharing problematic for a set of reasons that inspired us to instead define the
new term world library :
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To begin with, the term file sharing is not a scientifically defined one. It
came into everyday language through its use in mass media for networks like
Napster and Gnutella. While technically very different, these networks had
similar use cases that warrant the overarching term. When privacy hazards
like the copyright industry’s mass lawsuits against network users became
publicized, the term anonymous file sharing reflected the expectation that
these networks could be protected against such privacy violations through
the straightforward application of anonymization techniques such as the use
of proxies. As we will show in Chapter 2, these expectations have not been
met. Even though a number of anonymous file sharing systems have been
devised and built, none of them has been adopted for mass usage. In spite of
the dangers involved, the user base of traditional, non-anonymous file-sharing
networks still outnumbers those of these “third generation” networks by or-
ders of magnitude. The question of why this is the case has motivated our
research in no small degree, and in this thesis we hope to give not one, but
a number of answers. In short, we have come to the conclusion that the
approach suggested by the term anonymous file sharing is neither necessary
nor sufficient to achieve what we have termed world libraries. It is not neces-
sary because it is too specific: There are several ways for preserving privacy,
and anonymization is just one of them. It is not sufficient because it is too
general: Dark nets or friend-to-friend networks, for example, are a variant of
anonymous file sharing where virtual private subnets are formed by connect-
ing only to people a user trusts (e.g. [67, 106], see [115] for a survey). This
need for a trust relationship violates our requirement of an open untrusted
environment. While darknets may be useful for achieving privacy, their pre-
supposition of social relationships between users typically leads to isolated
network components and hinders mass use. Since we believe that not only
“anonymity loves company” but so does a world library user because com-
pany means more content/greater audience, we hold that a tolerance of open
untrusted environments is an important condition for such an application to
succeed. Very recently, the OneSwarm network [67] has pioneered the idea
of piggybacking trust relationships on existing social online networks. While
we cannot predict yet how much this will help the system scale, it serves to
illustrate another point that makes darknets unlikely candidates for success-
ful world libraries to our mind: Would the average person really like all their
social acquaintances on, say, Facebook, to know what kind of content they
store on their computers, publish, or peruse? As we will see in Section 1.3.1,
a major motive for privacy is freedom from social pressure. Ironically, most
people might fear social pressure to originate from their social contacts in the
first place, while they might even be indifferent to what random strangers
think of them.
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On an even more nontechnical level, we observe that the term file shar-
ing, though originally neutral, has become extremely loaded by both the
mass media, which in most cases can be seen as a belonging to what we call
the copyright industry in our discussion in 1.3.2, and a certain subculture of
mostly young Internet users that delight in a rebellious self-image of “you
can’t catch me”, as exemplified by the founders of the Bittorrent search web-
site “The Pirate Bay” [105]. Although file sharing networks like Bittorrent
are often used for legitimate purposes by any standard, and in spite of the
immense social utility of world libraries that we argue for in Section 1.3,
the notion of anonymous file sharing carries with it a connotation of bor-
derline legitimacy. Notice that this effect in itself might also contribute to
the curious lack of popularity of anonymous file sharing today. Ultimately,
the choice of term could be argued to have had a diminishing effect on both
technical efficiency and social acceptance of these world library forerunners.
For these reasons, we prefer to establish a well-defined term, encompassing
a number of properties that we deem essential requirements for successful
implementation and adoption, and carrying with it a neutral to positive
connotation, which, as we argue in the following section, can be defended by
appeal to philosophically grounded values and socioeconomic deliberation.
1.3 Motivation, Social Effects, and the Law
In this section we will motivate why we believe that a world library would
be a desirable artifact for societies in general. Clearly, it is a controversial
proposal if you look at the world-wide discussion around subjects like pri-
vacy, copyright, or anonymity abuse. Hence we will take as a starting point
a notion that, in our view, is rather uncontroversial: There is a clear need
for and inherent value in distributing large data volumes in open untrusted
environments for modern societies. This is evidenced, e.g., by the enormous
growth of the World Wide Web in the past 15 years. The United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) constitution
states that “the wide diffusion of culture, and the education of humanity
for justice and liberty and peace are indispensable to the dignity of man and
constitute a sacred duty which all the nations must fulfil in a spirit of mutual
assistance and concern” [134], which inspired the founding of their Commu-
nication and Information (CI) sector: “UNESCO supports actions designed
to empower people so that they can access and contribute to information
and knowledge flows.” [134]. In fact, as of this writing, UNESCO is about
to launch their own “World Digital Library” that “will make available on
the Internet, free of charge and in multilingual format, significant primary
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materials from cultures around the world, including manuscripts, maps, rare
books, musical scores, recordings, films, prints, photographs, architectural
drawings, and other significant cultural materials.” [137]. While one might
believe that this project obliterates the need for world libraries as we envi-
sion them, we rather see it as complementary. A technological solution as we
envision it will feature both advantages and disadvantages in comparison to
a centralized effort like the World Digital Library. For example, on the one
hand, we might not have the possibility of coordinated librarian work that
orders, structures, and polices the library. On the other hand, a truly dis-
tributed system might avoid legal barriers that could keep valuable content
from inclusion, and the general public might well have a different opinion of
what should be in the library than its librarians, such that the open approach
of world libraries might forestall the marginalization of rare, controversial,
subcultural, or any other material.
Certainly, one might hold that too much information can be a burden as
well as a grace, but as we have seen there is general consensus that access
to information is a valuable good. Thereby, looking back to our definition
in the previous section, most definitional elements of world libraries are not
contested very much at all. It is only the preservation of privacy that one
might have serious second thoughts about. Accordingly, our defense of the
philosophical concept of world libraries will at first look closely at the notion
of privacy: what is it, why do we need it, and how much is it worth? This
will then enable us to consider a few common objections or rather compet-
ing values that have to be weighed against the value of information sharing
in privacy. These can be of philosophical, social/economic, or legal nature.
We will argue that the philosophical and social value of information sharing
in privacy can outweigh these counter arguments. With respect to law, our
arguments can be outlined as follows: Firstly, we acknowledge that interna-
tionally, there is much confusion about the legal status of many questions
arising in information sharing and privacy. Secondly, we postulate that, fol-
lowing our philosophical and social arguments, the law should reflect the
greater good for society, and thus not keep people from using world libraries.
Thirdly, we observe that efforts in this direction are underway, and in the
mean time, our approach can be tailored to keep people from violating ex-
isting law.
1.3.1 Privacy
Privacy is a complex notion. Although we tend to recognize when something
is private, the idea is hard to conceptualize. A major part of philosopher
Judith Wagner DeCew’s book “In Pursuit of Privacy: Law, Ethics, and the
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Rise of Technology” [36] consists of an effort to define the phenomenon, and
after she spends pages on dissecting other authors’ definitions, her version
does little more than paraphrase the word private as “(. . . ) whatever is not
generally— that is, according to a reasonable person under normal circum-
stances, or according to certain social conventions—a legitimate concern of
others.” [36, p. 58]
This definition seems unsatisfactory because, instead of describing what
should not be “a legitimate concern of others”, it takes recourse to vague
terms like “reasonable person”. One way out of this dilemma is the appeal
for intuition to fill the void on a case-to-case basis. Still, DeCew goes on to
identify three aspects of privacy (cf. [36, p. 75 ff]):
• Informational privacy: Control over information about oneself
• Accessibility privacy: Decisions over who has physical access to one’s
person
• Expressive privacy: Ability for expressing one’s self-identity or person-
hood through speech or activity
Herein, we are obviously concerned with the first meaning, informational
privacy, in particular. This coincides with narrower definitions like the one
by Parent: “Privacy is the condition of not having undocumented personal
knowledge about one possessed by others” [102]. Again, terms like “undoc-
umented” or “personal” are rather vague, however, appealing to intuition
again, we deem this definition clear enough to work with for our purposes.
The justifications of privacy in the literature are just as diverse as the
definitions. They have in common that they intuitively recognize a human
(and maybe even animal) need for privacy. They differ chiefly in why we need
privacy. Again, we find DeCew’s account to be particularly convincing and
encompassing, precisely because it does not purport to be exhausting [36,
p. 74]:
(. . . ) privacy acts as a shield to protect us in various ways, and its
value lies in the freedom and independence it provides for us. Pri-
vacy shields us not only from interference and pressures that pre-
clude self-expression and the development of relationships, (. . . )
but also from intrusions and pressures arising from others’ access
to our persons and details about us. Threats of information leaks
as well as threats of control over our bodies, our activities, and
our power to make our own choices give rise to fears that we are
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being scrutinized, judged, ridiculed, pressured, coerced, or other-
wise taken advantage of by others. Protection of privacy enhances
and ensures the freedom from such scrutiny, pressure to conform,
and exploitation that we require so that as self-conscious beings
we can maintain our self-respect, develop our self-esteem, and in-
crease our ability to form a coherent identity and set of values, as
well as our ability to form varied and complex relationships with
others. The realm of the private thus encompasses the types of
information and activity that a reasonable person, in normal cir-
cumstances and under relevant social conditions, would view as
illegitimate concerns of others owing to the thread of such con-
straining scrutiny, prejudice, judgement, and coercion.
With this in mind, it is easy to imagine harm done by privacy violations
in our context: For example, borrowing books about non-traditional sexual
behavior from a library, let alone publishing material of this kind, might be
something desired to be kept private because public knowledge of the fact
might subject one to scrutiny, prejudice, judgement, pressure and coercion.
Or in another vision of privacy violation, exact knowledge of one’s media
consumption might enable companies to build a personality profile that eases
their influencing one’s buying decisions and thus helps them take advantage.
Patterns like this have become much more dangerous since the advent of
large-scale computing. James H. Moor uses the metaphor of greased data to
illustrate this danger2:
When information is computerized, it is greased to slide easily and
quickly to many ports of call. But legitimate concerns about pri-
vacy arise when this speed and convenience lead to the improper
exposure of information. Greased information is information that
moves like lightning and is hard to hold onto. [87]
This kind of specific informational privacy issue is what is usually ad-
dressed in a narrower, and typically European perspective of privacy as
“Datenschutz” or data security. It finds its most important legal expression
in the European Union’s “Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of individu-
als with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement
of such data” [49], which grants European citizens a wide array of rights for
controlling such “greased” data.
2Interestingly, this quality of data being greased is the same quality that raises concerns
about copyright issues as we will discuss in the next subsection.
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In European law, the more general right to privacy is recognized under
Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights [48], to which all EU
member states are signatories, and which has been interpreted very broadly
by the European Court of Human Rights.
In the USA, privacy in the law has a complicated history (cf. [36]). Since
Judge Thomas Cooley’s legal “treatise on the law of torts” declared the “right
to be let alone” [26] in 1878, privacy had been an interest in tort law only
for a long time. It wasn’t before 1965 that the Supreme Court began rec-
ognizing an apparently distinct right to privacy, which had more to do with
exercising freedom in making personal decisions as in DeCew’s definition of
expressive privacy. Yet it has never been given formal basic rights status
by being included expressly in the Constitution, instead “emanating” in a
“penumbral” way from other rights. In spite of this, all three strands of
privacy have been increasingly protected by American courts. However, the
United States have not adopted a specific general data protection right com-
parable to the EU Directive 95/46/EC, relying instead on self regulation and
individual case legislation, and this has lead to some controversy between
political and commercial entities in the EU and the US.
The level of legal privacy protection widely varies internationally, as is
already obvious from comparing EU and US law. Since the advent of the
Internet, though, national law cannot always be brought to protect interests
like privacy. For example, a web server might be in any country in the
world, and this might enable its owner to only respect local law in dealing
with the private data of users. This is why it has been argued that “It
is insufficient to protect ourselves with laws; we need to protect ourselves
with mathematics.” ([118], cited in [143]), the idea being that technology
like encryption can help protect civil rights. A world library can be seen as a
privacy enhancing technology (PET), an attempt at pursuing this goal. Yet
Tavani and Moor have made the point [131], and we will strongly affirm their
view in this thesis, that PETs alone are insufficient to guard against privacy
violations. They have to be complemented by national and international law
and policy. Yet in our view, this does not say anything against the usefulness
of PETs, especially with the understanding that legal protection in new fields
like the Internet is often evolving gradually, and technological artifacts might
improve the enforceability of legal rights. In fact, while the more technical
chapters of this thesis will make clear that perfect privacy through technology
is illusory at the state of the art and might perhaps never be achieved due
to theoretical bounds, we will argue in the rest of this chapter that such
fallibility of PETs like world libraries might even be seen as an asset.
The following section discusses some common objections to anonymous
file sharing that might carry over to world libraries. In order to weigh these
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against the possibility of private media publishing and consumption, we en-
dorse DeCew’s strategy for practical moral and legal assessment [36, p. 79]:
“(. . . ) begin with a presumption of a reasonable expectation of privacy (. . . )
while acknowledging that social, legal, and moral considerations may require
that the presumption be overridden.”. DeCew considers this a task “for
legislators, judges, and moral and political theorists” [ibid.], and while one
might take a slightly more democratic stance, we do not aim to make this
judgement, but rather enumerate some arguments that we consider worth
taking into account, and show how we believe a world library could actually
ease the implementation of such decisions.
1.3.2 Possible Objections
Copyright
The most common objection that has been brought against file sharing net-
works since the days of Napster has been an economic one: A free exchange of
media possibly endangers business models that might be subsumed under the
name copyright industry. These are businesses that derive revenue from the
control of access to copies of media like books, music, movies, television, or
computer games. To give one example, for several years, the number of copies
of songs downloaded from the Internet without permission from the copyright
holder has dramatically exceeded the number of copies sold. While the effect
of file sharing on record sales is debated (cf., e.g. [95, 79, 113, 144]), clearly,
some rights holders see this development as a loss of income and have an
interest in fighting it. One of their strategies has been to lobby for increased
legal protection that makes sharing copyrighted material partly illegal—as
in the adapted versions of the German Urheberrecht [71, p. 296 ff], or the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) in the USA [125]— then moni-
tor file sharing networks for offenders, and sue them accordingly. One of the
distinguishing features of world libraries is in their focus on the preservation
of privacy. Protecting the link between identities and actions of users in the
network might make this strategy more expensive, or even illegal3. Looking
at this case with DeCew’s method of presuming a reasonable expectation of
privacy, we have to weigh the benefits of informational privacy against the
potential harm done. It is obvious that the copyright industry suffers from
the development of technology that makes media, which had been expen-
sive to reproduce in former times, greased data. The question is, does this
3Some legal constructs make circumvention of protection measures illegal, even if the
behavior protected against would have been legal in the first place—copy protection
mechanisms in the DMCA are one example.
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outweigh our expectation of privacy?
Grodzinsky and Tavani have examined this conflict in their recent pa-
per on “Online File Sharing: Resolving the Tensions between Privacy and
Property Interests” [61]. Recurring to Helen Nissenbaum’s view of “Pri-
vacy as Contextual Integrity” [93], they conclude that “(. . . ) P2P networks
are contextually private situations and, as such, protecting privacy (. . . ) is
essential.” [61]. In Nissenbaum’s language, this means that DeCew’s “pre-
sumption of privacy”, a concept that Grodzinsky and Tavani also explicitly
endorse, is violated in a way not justified by the ends of protecting copy-
right holders’ interests. Furthermore, the authors contend that “(. . . ) with
one or more of the distribution models (. . . ) we can both protect privacy
interests of the individuals and help ensure that property owners’ interests
are also reasonably preserved.” [ibid.]. The distribution models mentioned
in the paper are comparatively conservative, offering music downloads for
payment. While these models have gained popularity in recent years, we will
see that there are new business ideas that depart even more radically from
the status quo and are therefore even more immune to the economic harms
of free information exchange.
We may even question if ensuring privacy in media exchange networks
were to influence the economic development at all. The industry has sued
thousands of people worldwide, and while there has been a slowdown in
the growth of file sharing, it could be attributed to different factors, like the
adoption of novel business strategies that make official channels an attractive
alternative. It is very questionable, considering the sheer ongoing extent of
peer-to-peer data exchange, if legal proceedings can put an end to a practice
held justifiable by millions of users [10]. Thus, sacrificing the privacy of
even more people in order to ease prosecution of copyright offenders seems
questionable, too.
Lawrence Lessig, a professor of law at Stanford Law School, points out [75]
that copyright had been devised to grant booksellers a limited exclusive right
for printing original content in order to stimulate the publishing of creative
works. He argues that today, on the contrary, copyright is abused to endanger
cultural diversity by keeping people from accessing and creating — because
most creative works are based on previous work in some way — media. He
goes on to say that while societies have to find a way to pay creators, it is
a historically normal effect of technological innovation (citing examples like
radio and film) that old business models do not work anymore. And indeed
there are alternative economic models that might ensure that creative work
remains attractive without requiring exclusive control over copying. These in-
clude compulsory collective management of the performance right for making
a work available, which a French feasibility study found workable [8], other
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compulsory licensing schemes, sponsoring and advertising, and several other
variants like the street performer protocol [15], in addition to the more estab-
lished pay-per-download and physical media based approaches. The music
industry, as the first copyright industry that has been significantly affected
by the greased data phenomenon, has largely compensated their losses by de-
veloping more genre specific income generation channels like concert tickets
or merchandising, to complement the above generic strategies.
A more thorough discussion of “Economic and cultural effects of file shar-
ing on music, film and games” can be found in a comprehensive study com-
missioned by the Dutch Ministries of Education, Culture and Science, Eco-
nomic Affairs and Justice [46]. While the authors acknowledge that file
sharing “entails a transfer of welfare from producers to consumers” [46, p. 3],
“The research shows that the economic implications of file sharing for welfare
in the Netherlands are strongly positive in the short and long terms.” [ibid.].
To summarize, we are witnessing a change in cultural business models
spurred by technological innovation. While there are winners and losers in
any such change process, there is little hope that this process can be upheld
or reversed by suing users, and even if there was, it is not clear how this would
justify giving up the important value of privacy for many users. Fortunately,
there have been attempts at more holistic approaches: New business models
have been proposed and are being carried out, even from within the industry,
and copyright law reforms addressing the problems outlined have been pro-
posed both in the USA [75] and in Europe [71]. While these developments
are ongoing, it is important to note that world libraries per se are not un-
lawful in any jurisdiction we are aware of. The Owner-Free File System (see
Chapter 2.3) has even been designed in order to keep its users from infringing
existing copyright legislation. It may well be advisable to make the system
adaptable to the ongoing legal battles surrounding copyright, for example by
adhering to safe harbour policies as laid out in the DMCA.
Further-Reaching Transgressions
Other, more fundamental rights might be at stake when we allow for private
publishing and consumption of media. This might include the violation of
other people’s privacy, or the often-cited examples of child pornography or
hate speech. Naturally, there are cases that justify the abridgment of the
publisher’s or downloader’s privacy. Observe, however, that societies have
strong incentives to prosecute such behavior, that they are usually willing to
invest significant resources (e.g. police work) in order to end it, and that it is
comparatively rare. Like any other real-life communication system, say the
postal service or telephones, world libraries can be abused, but also policed,
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given enough political will and resources. It can be argued that criminals
have more secure (and expensive) ways of communicating anyway. In fact, it
is a recurring topic of this thesis that there is no perfect privacy, and we can
merely hope to make privacy violation so costly that it deters most attackers.
We have to rely on non-technical measures, like the law, to make sure that
very powerful adversaries, like national states, do not abuse their power.
We strive for a balance that makes it very efficient for legitimate users to
privately publish and peruse media in world libraries, very costly to violate
privacy illegitimately, yet retains societies’ right to invest significant means
in order to keep individual offenders from committing crimes. Because such
grave misuses are relatively uncommon, the total social cost stays low.
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Chapter 2
Existing Systems/Case Studies
Returning is the motion of the Tao.
Yielding is the way of the Tao.
The ten thousand things are born of being.
Being is born of not being.
[50, verse 40]
In this section, we discuss legacy peer-to-peer systems that have been
designed and actually implemented in order to permit file sharing while up-
holding some kind of privacy. Most of these systems actually try to provide
anonymity, which is one technological approach to privacy protection. See
Chapter 4 for a formal definition of anonymity. Note that we purposefully ex-
clude purely theoretical proposals, censorship-resistant publishing systems,
general purpose anonymity systems that do not cater to typical file shar-
ing needs such as searching (e.g. pure MIX systems [17, 32]), low-latency
anonymity networks, and darknets. This is because, as justified in detail
in Section 1.2, we do not consider these viable candidates for world library
implementations. Unfortunately, none of the systems described herein has
succeeded as a world library either. We hope to give some insight into pos-
sible reasons. At the same time, this provides us with an opportunity to
describe some popular approaches to anonymization by looking at the net-
works that implement them. One major technique we do not cover in this
way is the dining cryptographers family of methods that has been discov-
ered by David Chaum [18]. This is because although it provides perfect
anonymity in some sense, it does not scale to large network sizes because it
requires communication overhead linear in the size of the network for every
bit that is transmitted. There have been attempts at making the approach
scale by splitting the network into small cliques that serve as anonymity sets
[122, 54], but these have not led to the creation of a publicly used file sharing
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network. Another key technique in anonymity is onion routing, which has
been popularized by the Tor network [41]. In this general scheme, a node
indirects its traffic to a circuit of freely chosen servers by using layered en-
cryption. Even though this technique has not yet been used successfully in
a file sharing approach, we do not rule out this possibility. In particular,
we expect that a true peer-to-peer implementation of this principle would be
necessary for it to be a component in a world library. However, this in turn
necessitates a scalable and secure network information distribution service.
In Chapter 3 we discuss approaches to DHT security that can be applied to
this important subproblem.
There have been few attempts at surveying anonymous file sharing net-
works [21, 82, 119, 44]. One explanation might go as follows: As we will
see, many implementations do not originate in academia. What is more, as
we have argued in Chapter 1, media pressure and social dynamics have con-
tributed to a certain air of borderline legitimacy about file sharing. Chotia
and Chatzikokolakis [21] relate the case of Isamu Kaneko, the developer of the
WinNY [126] application, who was actually arrested and trialed for assisting
copyright violation in Japan. It seems understandable that stories like these,
in combination with media hostility, might not only keep some researchers
away from such a politically loaded field, but also instill a certain kind of
paranoia in anonymous file sharing developers. We have personally observed
very cautious behavior when we tried to get in contact with some program
authors in the course of our research. Social pressures like these can not only
account for both our and other authors’ difficulty in collecting information,
but might also figure in the relative lack of success that characterizes all the
networks we survey.
2.1 Ant Routing Networks
In accordance with a general trend in massively distributed systems, the early
designs feature unstructured networks [91, 3, 127], while more recently, DHTs
have been employed in some applications [126, 94]. Unstructured approaches
form an ad hoc network by connecting new nodes to arbitrary peers. The first
peers that a new node needs to get bootstrapped are usually learnt of in some
out-of-band way, like a web cache. Anonymity, or rather pseudonymity, is
attempted to be achieved by separating public underlying network addresses
(IPs) from private IDs. While in order to uphold a connection over the
Internet, a node needs to know its neighbors’ IPs, these are not directly used
to route in the overlay network. Instead, these networks use variants of the
so-called ant routing [14]. The following paragraph contains a description
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of the process, simplified enough to fit all ants routing systems we consider:
MUTE, ANts, and StealthNet [91, 3, 127].
When querying for some content, a query package is generated containing
the secret ID of the searcher. This package is then broadcast to all neighbors
in the network. A receiving node checks its local data for availability of the
queried content. If none is available, it rebroadcasts the package to all of
its neighbors, unless some kind of time-to-live (TTL) mechanism is expired,
noting the reply ID and direction the package came from. If it finds some
content locally that fits the query, it returns a result message by sending
it to the reply ID in the direction the query came from. An intermediate
node whose ID does not fit the reply ID should have the reply ID in its
routing table because it must have broadcast the query package from this
ID before. So it sends the package on in the direction the query came from.
The routing tables are like pheromone scent traces left by ants who mark
their way home, hence the name. Since queries are broadcast, there might
be many directions that a package from a certain ID has come from. In
this case, there is some mechanism to choose one or several of these, like
for example a random choice biased towards directions where more packets
from this ID originated. Once initial “scent marks” have been laid between
the searcher and the file provider, these can be used and strengthened in the
actual file request and download process.
Ant routing has several interesting properties: Notice first that, like in
the Crowds [111] indirection scheme, a node can never really be sure if some
package originated at his neighbor node x, unless he controls the entire neigh-
borhood of x. This is because x might just be relaying the package for some
other neighbor. Although there are some attacks, like the predecessor at-
tack [142, 1] that can establish strong probabilistic confidence in x being the
source of a package, or, what is more, being the node that owns some ID
y, at least some deniability or possible innocence [111] is retained regarding
this suspicion. Unfortunately, there are many details that complicate a se-
curely working implementation of this process. One of them is TTL design:
A straightforward TTL counter implementation forfeits deniability because
counting backwards tells an attacker how long the package has been travel-
ing. Arbitrary TTL values open up a playing field for DoS attacks since a
node might decide to flood the network with its query. Actually, the flooding
approach to search is one of the greatest weak points in unstructured net-
works because it allows for cheap DoS attacks, even if implemented correctly.
Jason Rohrer discusses many more challenges to a working TTL solution on
the MUTE website [91]. Unfortunately, his conclusions seem slightly misled:
“(. . . ) the branching factor causes the number of distinct paths to grow ex-
ponentially as a message gets farther from its source, essentially outweighing
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any mechanism that drops a message probabilistically at each hop.” [91].
This claim, repeated in more detail later on, can easily be refuted by coun-
terexample: Say, e.g., that every node x decides on forwarding the query to
each neighbor independently with probability q/|N(x)| for some 0 ≤ q < 1,
where |N(x)| is the number of neighbors x has. Let Z be the number of
neighbors that x forwards the query to. Observe that EZ = q by the linear-
ity of expectation. The amount of nodes queried by a probabilistic flooding
process where nodes decide independently of each other can be modeled as a
branching process (cf. e.g. [60, p. 150ff]), at least when we are interested in
an upper bound since many nodes will be queried more than once in the real
process. Then, if Zn is the number of nodes queried in the n-th generation,
P [Zn > 0] = P [Zn ≥ 1] ≤ EZn = (EZ)n = qn,
where we use the Markov inequality and a lemma from Grimmet and Stirza-
ker’s monograph [60, p. 152]. We see that the probability of survival is falling
exponentially with each round. While this does not imply practical useful-
ness of this flooding algorithm, it shows that it is possible to design a purely
randomized TTL mechanism that only queries a small amount of nodes with
high probability. Indeed, Roberto Rossi’s ANts file sharing application [3]
routes in a very similar way. MUTE’s search algorithm is more involved and
contains a deterministic utility counter mechanism that is “sandwiched” be-
tween randomized parts in order to counter obvious attacks. This strategy
even defends against statistical attacks in that the randomness used is fixed
at program start [91, 1].
A further basic difference between MUTE and ANts lies in the end-to-end
encryption that ANts provides. Rohrer argues that end-to-end encryption in
an anonymous network of this kind is useless since every node could deploy a
man-in-the-middle attack in the absence of an out-of-band trust management
system. Rossi seems to accept this argument, yet holds that this measure
may still enhance privacy for the user. An online article by Michael Ingram
articulates these philosophical differences in more detail [66].
Tom Chotia has analyzed MUTE using the π-calculus [20] and discovered
a vulnerability that has been removed by making nodes use a public key as
their ID and sign their messages. This vulnerability carries over to all the
ants-style networks we consider and should therefore be fixed accordingly in
all of them.
Rshare [127, 43] is a similar network designed by Lars Regensburger,
whose client software has now been renamed to StealthNet. Several security
flaws have been found in it by the authors of GNUnet [43], and most of them
have subsequently been removed. Many attacks on these unstructured net-
works, including timing attacks that are very costly to defend against [76],
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use the fact that a node is free to chose its neighbors in unstructured net-
works to connect to many peers without being noticed. This is very similar
to a Sybil attack [42], but even cheaper for the attacker in terms of physical
resources. Although this attack vector is well known [43, 21], to our knowl-
edge there are no published attempts at practically exploiting timing attacks
in a deployed anonymous file sharing network.
MUTE is written in C++, ANts in Java, and StealthNet in C# using Mi-
crosoft’s .NET framework. This makes both MUTE and ANts natively work
on the leading operating system platforms Windows, Mac OS, and Linux,
while StealthNet is restricted to Windows. Alternative client programs for
Unix-based systems exist, however, using the Mono framework instead of
.NET. All three applications are Open Source licensed, with StealthNet and
ANts using the GNU General Public License and MUTE in the public do-
main, yet the source code is poorly documented in all three cases, impeding
access and analysis. While StealthNet is still regularly updated, develop-
ment seems to have ceased for years with both MUTE and ANts. This is
underscored by our observations because even though we could technically
connect to the MUTE and ANts networks in our trials, StealthNet has been
the only system reviewed in this section that actually allowed for download-
ing files. In contrast to the other networks, StealthNet seems to carry a
moderate amount of traffic and content today. Download rates vary a lot,
but seem to be tolerable at least for moderately sized files. In our view, all
three networks have struggled with debugging, usability, and adoption, and
while MUTE is arguably the best known internationally, StealthNet seems to
be the only one that has retained some relevance today, particularly for Ger-
man users. Interestingly, all three networks have been developed by solitary
authors without substantial organizational support or financing.
We observe that although the initial idea for these systems is rather sim-
ple, network details with regard to both security and efficiency turn out to
be difficult to implement and test, owing to the distributed nature of the
system. As described above, ant routing in unstructured networks has unre-
solved security issues. Also, because queries only reach parts of the network
for performance and scalability reasons, it cannot guarantee finding existing
content in the network, and both search and transfer can be extremely ineffi-
cient due to the high degree of indirection and unpredictable network struc-
ture. Because every data package is routed through a possibly great number
of nodes between the sender and receiver, nodes exhibit a high average band-
width load that is particularly damaging because of the asymmetric nature
of most end user Internet service provider (ISP) connections (cf. [100]). We
conjecture that it is this issue in particular that keeps unstructured anony-
mous file sharing networks from scaling, although additional research will
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be necessary to confirm this. Furthermore, usability concerns, such as user
interface design, transfer speed, or ease of deployment seem to be crucial in
the adoption process. Finally, the reclusive behavior of the authors, lack of
development and deployment community, and social marginalization of the
stated or perceived motivation can be conjectured to be partly responsible
for the scarcity of end user support.
2.2 Other Anonymous File Sharing Networks
WinNY, Share, and Perfect Dark [126] are anonymous file sharing systems
that have become very popular in Japan, with download and usage numbers
far exceeding those of any comparable system. Unfortunately, access to infor-
mation about them is difficult due to language barriers, legal threats, and the
authors’ reliance on “security by obscurity”. We have therefore not been able
to find out details about the systems’ design and since neither original sources
nor scientific material were available to us, had to rely on Wikipedia for the
following information. WinNY has been developed by Isamu Kaneko, with
its name alluding to the previously popular (in Japan) WinMX file sharing
system that did not feature anonymization. Two WinNY users have been
arrested by the Kyoto police for sharing copyrighted material, though al-
legedly the identification process involved the application’s non-anonymous
forum feature. Kaneko, too, has been arrested and convicted of assisting
copyright violations [141]. This serves to explain why the authors of the
next-generation products Share and Perfect Dark chose to remain anony-
mous. Share users have also been arrested both for copyright infringement
and, very recently, for uploading child pornography [140]. In light of these de-
velopments, it seems that Share’s anonymity has been broken, and this might
have been one of the reasons behind the emergence of Perfect Dark. Perfect
Dark is a very recent system that is in active development and presupposes
nontrivial bandwidth and hard drive space requirements. It is said to rely on
several DHT-like structures and use strong cryptography throughout [139].
In our opinion, the most interesting aspect of these Japanese file sharing
networks lies in their apparent popularity. Though we did not gain access to
their technical internals, it would seem improbable that they employ break-
through technology that could not be found in the European/American al-
ternatives. Just as the ants-based systems reviewed above, these networks
seem to be efforts of solitary authors without broad organizational backing.
They are available for the Windows platform only, and, reportedly, “The
Share GUI requires a manual or tutorial to understand” [140], so we cannot
assume superior usability either. Furthermore, the legal pressure on authors
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and users of anonymous file sharing systems is arguably even higher in Japan
than in Europe or the United States.
However, high speed Internet access for end users seems to be much more
available in Japan, and indeed, Perfect Dark requires a minimum upload
bandwidth of 100 KB/s, which is far from common in Europe today. This
provides further evidence for our conjecture that the asymmetric nature of
many potential peers’ Internet access is a main hindrance to successful de-
ployment of many anonymous file sharing schemes.
“GNUnet is a framework for secure peer-to-peer networking that does
not use any centralized or otherwise trusted services. A first service imple-
mented on top of the networking layer allows anonymous censorship-resistant
file-sharing.” [53]. As already apparent from the website’s characterization,
GNUnet shares with Freenet the focus on censorship-resistance, which im-
plies a strong adversary and priority of security over usability. We have
discussed in Section 1.2.3 why we exclude this kind of system from closer
examination. When we mention GNUnet here anyway, it is because firstly,
it has expressly been designed for file sharing, and secondly because it is one
of the very few examples in anonymous file sharing that could be said to
be rooted in academia. Indeed, some of the authors of GNUnet are recog-
nized computer security researchers, and several papers related to its design
have been published [7, 62, 51]. We refer to these publications for techni-
cal details. Dennis Ku¨gler has identified several attacks on the anonymity
and censorship-resistance of GNUnet [72], which mostly rely on performance-
enhancing features that set GNUnet apart from Freenet. GNUnet is open
source/free software under the GNU General Public License, comparatively
well-documented in many languages, and available for most popular oper-
ating systems, although we did not succeed in compiling the source code
ourselves. In contrast to most systems surveyed, GNUnet is a community
effort. Thus it seems that many traps that might have kept other systems
from succeeding have been avoided with GNUnet. Still, the developers ad-
mit that “The network is still fairly small and downloads can be rather slow.
Only little content is available, thus it is not always a bug if you get few (or
no) search results.” [53]. GNUnet organizes peers in an unstructured net-
work and uses these peers for indirection. It therefore suffers from the same
bandwidth bottlenecks and attack vectors as the ant-routing based systems
detailed above. In particular, although GNUnet has been subjected to in-
depth scientific analysis, the ad hoc nature of the network does not allow for
meaningful bounds on performance and security.
“Nodezilla is a secured, distributed and fault tolerant routing system (aka
Grid Network). Its main purpose is to serve as a link for distributed services
built on top of it (like chat, efficient video multicasting streaming, File Shar-
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ing, secured file store ...)” [94]. Even though Nodezilla exists since 2004 at
least, it appears to have found little reception in both scientific and popular
media. Nodezilla’s internal workings are described in rather high level fash-
ion on their website, and it appears that the network uses similar concepts
as the OFF system, relying on a proprietary DHT implementation. We have
been able to connect to the network using their elegant Java front-end as well
as find some content, yet did not succeed in retrieving any of it. Nodezilla
appears to be sporadically updated still. The latest application built upon it
is a decentralized storage system for torrent files for the Bittorrent network,
which might help censorship-resistance, but not privacy.
Rodi [114] implements a very different approach to privacy. From our un-
derstanding of the documentation, Rodi might be described as a framework
rather than an application. It provides both search capabilities for IP ranges,
encryption functionality, and anonymity methods. Rodi is interesting in that
it consciously avoids large scale indirection, with a stated goal of efficiency
over strong anonymity. The main anonymity mechanism employed is UDP
data transport with return IP address spoofing. Using a trusted node as a
so-called bouncer, the sender is still able to establish a bidirectional commu-
nication with the receiver. Large data volumes are sent directly via UDP
to the receiver, while less data intensive control signals can be sent back
through the bouncer. This allows for practical sender anonymity, yet opens
a number of possible attacks, e.g. because the bouncer has to be trusted.
Rodi’s author explicitly trades theoretical security for practical efficiency. In
particular, all security measures are optional and not enabled in the appli-
cation per default. In our trial we have been able to connect to other nodes,
yet could not find any content. While the idea of IP spoofing is appealing
because it uses features of the underlying network and avoids unnecessary
indirection, Rodi as it is seems to lend itself more to experimentation than
large scale library use.
Marabunta [84] is an anonymous peer-to-peer platform originating at the
University of Zaragoza. Unfortunately, virtually all documentation and the
program itself is in Spanish. It seems to implement an ants-like approach
and uses UDP. We did not succeed in connecting to the network, but this
could be attributed to the user interface in Spanish language.
2.3 The Owner-Free File System
From a discussion on the OFF IRC channel [136]:
So originally the OFF System was a mental exercise to create
discussion about copyright issues. The idea being that there are
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[some things] that have always been legal in society, that are
transitioning to being though[t] of as less wholesome. The trigger
of course was the “file sharing” lawsuits. When I grew up there
were public service announcements (PSAs) on children’s TV that
used to say... “It’s nice to share. :-)” (. . . ) that was a campaign
to create better children and future citizens by getting people to
“play together nicely”. It went along with other programs like
“public television” and a rebirth of local libraries and reading
rooms for [children]. But enough about the olden days. By the
time the RIAA had sued the first 4 students, it was clear that
it was no longer nice to share. and that public libraries were no
longer [an] obvious public good. (. . . )
Since it has been legal for 300 years to donate your old pa-
per books to the library. Has anyone NOT done so at one time
or another? Now it is commonly thought that paper books are
going away, along with plastic discs. And all media will become
“purely digital”. so in that hypothesized future, can we no longer
donate our purchased media to a public library? That seems like
a “bad thing” to me. I’d rather be on the side arguing that public
libraries are a good thing. since NOBODY hates a librarian.
As the above quotation by Bob Way, the initiator of the Owner-Free File
System, suggests, OFF’s philosophy is probably closest to the spirit of a
world library among all surveyed systems. Indeed, our collaboration with
the creators of OFF has substantially informed this thesis. Accordingly, we
discuss OFF in more detail than the other systems in this chapter, as a case
study in the implementation of a world library. Beginning with a technical
introduction to OFF’s design, we go on to describe some attacks on and
weaknesses of the OFF system. Assessing the scalability of the network
suggests some ideas for remedies to these issues, before we conclude with an
overall assessment of the approach and its implementation.
2.3.1 Introduction to the OFF System
“The Owner-Free [File System] has often been described as the first bright-
net; A distributed system where no one breaks the law, so no one need hide in
the dark.” [97]. OFF builds on the idea of multi-use encoding that has been
articulated since at least the turn of the century in a number of ways by var-
ious people [130, 135, 81]: Files are partitioned into blocks of equal size, and
a bit-wise XOR (⊕) operation is performed on tuples of these blocks so that
the resulting blocks can be said to have multiple uses or meanings. In par-
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ticular, the authors argue that this idea renders meaningless or inconsistent
any theory of ownership over digitally represented media [97]: Assume that
person A owns block X, and B owns block Y . Then who owns Z = X ⊕ Y ,
a block that is clearly derived from both X and Y ? Since X = Z ⊕ Y and
Y = Z⊕X, there is no consistent nontrivial way of declaring ownership over
blocks, numbers, or digital data in general. The OFF system is implemented
as a distributed storage for multi-use blocks, and the authors contend that
because every block that is uploaded, downloaded, or stored in OFF has mul-
tiple, and possibly infinite, meanings, such an act per se cannot be prohibited
by law. Before we discuss the implications of this argument, let us provide
some more technical details.
An OFF client manages a cache of blocks. Blocks consist of exactly 128
KB data and are identified by their 160-bit (20 Byte) SHA-1 hash values,
while node IDs are SHA-1 hashes of their RSA public keys, so as in a DHT1
(cf. Chapter 3), block names and node IDs are elements of the same space,
with the Hamming distance as distance function. Caches are usually seeded
with a few random blocks.
Storing or inserting a file consists of the following process: The file is
partitioned into blocks, and for each block X, the result of X ⊕ Y ⊕ Z
is added to the cache, where Y, Z are random preexisting blocks from the
cache2. Furthermore, one descriptor block (or several chained descriptor
blocks for very long files), containing the hash values of the various block
triples (Y, Z,X ⊕ Y ⊕ Z) in order, is generated and stored just like the file
blocks. Finally, a URL containing file metadata and the hashes of the block
triple that results in the descriptor block when XORed, is returned to the
user.
Stored blocks may then be dispersed, i.e. pushed to three nodes that
are close to their hash value. This involves the concept of a bucket : This is
the part of the cache that a user altruistically donates to the network. It is
supposed to contain blocks that are close by Hamming distance to the node’s
ID. A dynamically adjusted bucket radius is used to decide when to accept
a block into the bucket. Blocks that do not fit into the bucket are pushed
to other known nodes closer to the respective block ID. The actual DHT
protocol is rather complex and ad hoc and tries to strike a dynamic balance
between issues as diverse as block availability, user privacy, and efficiency.
It even includes a trust system, though its use is disabled by default at the
time of writing. Unfortunately, it is also poorly documented. All network
1The developers have said that they were not aware of the DHT concept when they
first conceived this system.
2Actually, the size of the tuple is not restricted, but 3 is by far the most commonly
used.
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communication is unencrypted and uses a variant of the standard HTTP
protocol.
After downloading the blocks that can be used to make up a file, that
file has to be explicitly retrieved by the user, which is another word for
reconstruction of the file using the URL, descriptor block(s), and the actual
file blocks. The authors claim that URLs are the only kind of information
in the OFF system that directly carry meaning, or user intent. That is why,
although in the current system URLs on users’ machines can be searched
much like in Gnutella-like file sharing systems, this aspect of the system
is planned to be externalized in some form, such as URL web catalogues,
Tor hidden services, etc.; the idea being that while this data directly carries
semantics, it is both low in bandwidth usage and, as a form of link or pointer,
non-censorable in many jurisdictions. Because efficient distribution systems
for this kind of data already exist in the non-anonymous Internet or other
anonymity services, the developers plan to restrict OFF to “owner-free data”,
that is blocks, in the future.
OFF is the product of a small and tightly knit group of enthusiasts,
originating in a work of “immersive interactive fiction” [132] initiated by
Bob Way that ended up having real-world consequences. The whole story is
dramatic and colorful enough for a novel and therefore out of scope in this
thesis. We refer the interested reader to the referenced website. While there
are a number of supporters that communicate using an IRC channel [98], only
one developer continuously works on the client application written in C++.
A second client is being written in Ruby at this time by Philipp Claves. The
client application can be deployed on all major operating systems, and is
stable and usable enough for early adoption at least. Compared to the size
of the network, a large amount of content has been uploaded.
2.3.2 Attacks on OFF
Questioning the Assumptions
There are a number of interesting questions brought up by OFF’s concept
of multi-use data. Indeed, it seems difficult to defend meaning, ownership,
copyright, or liability for a single block in the OFF network, for the reasons
outlined above3. This has another, more subtle implication that has been
intended by the authors. As the name suggests, US copyright law relies
heavily on the notion of a copy. In particular, it protects copies of a work from
being made, distributed, made available, etc.. However, when downloading
media from OFF, no actual copy has to be made, even when perusing that
3See below for more arguments.
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media. For example, for viewing a video, it might be enough to stream that
video to the screen, while only ever retrieving a portion of the work at a
time. In the extreme case, the XOR operation might be performed bit-wise,
such that only tiny fragments of a copy ever appear in the user’s computer.
While these arguments seem very legalistic, in a sense that is their point:
to show the inappropriateness of yesterday’s law for the digital age. However,
the approach might be seen as insufficient in two respects: Firstly, it seems
predictable that international courts and lawmakers would simply dismiss the
technical specifics of a system like OFF, instead focusing on the intentions
of users. Secondly, it says nothing about our stated goal of privacy. In a
sense, these two points coincide: Privacy could be achieved if the intentions
of users were hidden. This observation suggests a couple of questions:
1. Are blocks really meaningless data?
2. What does the observable behavior of an OFF client imply about the
intentions of its user?
Both questions have to be made more concrete before we can begin to
answer them scientifically. In order to clarify them, we will employ some
concepts from Kolmogorov complexity [78]. We will use an informal approach
in order to avoid excessive definitional overhead and point the interested
reader to Li and Vita`nyi’s essential monograph [78] for mathematical details.
All our arguments are easily formalized, yet to our mind gain readability by
sticking to the informal notions.
Definition 2 The Kolmogorov complexity K(Y |X) of a string Y given a
string X is the length of a shortest program written in a fixed language, say,
Haskell, that outputs Y on input X. Additionally, let K(Y ) = K(Y |ǫ) and
let X, Y denote a standard string encoding of the ordered tuple (X, Y ).
In the above definition, ǫ depicts the empty string. Furthermore, it is easy
to prove that K(Y |X) is not computable and that the choice of program-
ming language only affects Kolmogorov complexity by an additive constant
(because we can write a constant size interpreter for any Turing complete
language in any other). In order to minimize constants and thus make our
observations more meaningful with regard to a fixed block size of 128 KB, it
would be advisable to formalize our arguments using a language that allows
for small descriptions of strings.
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The Semantics of Static Block Sets
In the framework of Kolmogorov complexity, and concerning a single block,
we may restate the first question above as follows: Given a random cache
block X and any file block Y , how probable is it that K(Y |X) << K(Y )?
In other words, is X useful for constructing Y in the sense that, given X, we
need much less information for expressing Y than without X?
A single block in an OFF cache is usually either random or has been cre-
ated by XORing some file block with at least two other blocks. By random we
mean drawn according to the uniform distribution among all blocks of length
128 KB, which is equivalent to setting each bit of a block to 0 or 1 with prob-
ability 1/2 independently. It is easily verified that for any block X, X⊕Y is
random when Y is random. By induction, every block in the cache is random
because it is the result of an XOR operation with a random block. More-
over, by a simple counting argument, most blocks are incompressible (cf. [78,
Theorem 3.3.1]). That is, with high probability (w.h.p.), K(X) ≥ |X|
for a random block X and thus for any block in the cache. Suppose that
K(Y |X1 ⊕X2 ⊕ Y ) << K(Y ) for cache blocks X1, X2 and any file block Y .
This means that there is a small program P (much smaller than K(Y )) that
returns Y , given X1⊕X2⊕Y . Notice thatX1⊕X2 is random and thus incom-
pressible w.h.p.. However, X1⊕X2 = (X1⊕X2⊕Y )⊕Y . Hence, we can write
a program that includes (X1⊕X2⊕ Y ), calls P as a subroutine to return Y ,
and calculates X1⊕X2 using a simple XOR of both blocks. This shows that
K(X1⊕X2, Y ) ≤ K(X1⊕X2⊕Y )+ |P |+ c where c is a small constant. But
because X1 ⊕X2 ⊕ Y has the same length as X1 ⊕X2, which is incompress-
ible, and |P | is much smaller4 than K(Y ), we have that K(X1 ⊕X2, Y ) <<
K(X1 ⊕ X2) + K(Y ) w.h.p.. However, up to a fixed additive constant,
K(X1 ⊕ X2, Y ) = K(X1 ⊕ X2) + K(Y |(X1 ⊕ X2), K(X1 ⊕ X2)) [78, The-
orem 3.9.1]. This implies K(Y |(X1 ⊕ X2), K(X1 ⊕ X2)) << K(Y ). Yet in
general5, X1 ⊕ X2 and Y are unrelated since X1 ⊕ X2 is random and inde-
pendent from Y , so knowing X1 ⊕ X2 does not give us information about
Y . This line of reasoning demonstrates that w.h.p., single OFF cache blocks
do not carry information about inserted file blocks in a strong mathematical
sense.
Another way of interpreting the first question posed above is looking
at the multi-use property of blocks. How many uses does a block have?
Searching the live network for URLs revealed a total of 3781 files. We tried
to acquire descriptor blocks for these files and counted the number of files each
4A requirement on formalizing this notion of “much smaller” is that it abstracts from
small constants like c.
5Unless Y were chosen by an adversary knowing X1 ⊕X2.
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block occurred in, taking into account a total of 278850 block occurrences.
The resulting distribution depicted in Figure 2.1 bounds the actual number
of uses per block from below since we could not acquire all descriptor blocks
and may have overlooked an unknown amount of URLs. Indeed, the average
number of observed uses is about 1.73, whereas in theory, the average has
to converge to 3: For every new block, there are three blocks (including the
new one) that receive another use. The graph shows that while most blocks
have only a single (known) use, there are some that are used quite often. The
maximum observed number of uses is 16. So both in terms of Kolmogorov
complexity and multiple use, we can affirm that single blocks could indeed
be considered meaningless or owner-free.
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Figure 2.1: Number of uses found for blocks in the live OFF network
Of course, when looking at the meaning of blocks, we do not have to
restrict ourselves to single blocks. Sets of blocks cannot be said to be mean-
ingless in general in any of the above senses. Let us take the extreme example
of the set S of all blocks that are necessary to retrieve some file F . In the
conditional Kolmogorov formulation, again using an informal notation that
is straightforward to formalize, K(F |S) ∈ O(1) because a fixed program can
be used in conjunction with a fixed-size URL to retrieve the file. So a specific
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set of blocks does help to retrieve the file, in fact, that is the point of a file
sharing system like OFF.
Also, it is highly unlikely that S can be used to retrieve another file G
instead of F , so S cannot be said to have multiple uses: This is because for
every block in F , S contains two anonymizing blocks that existed before this
file block was stored, and one result block that was introduced into the cache
only with storing F . While anonymizing blocks overlap between files through
block reuse, result blocks are introduced newly for every file and, as we have
argued above, are random, though not necessarily independent. Unless G is
a substring of F , F and G differ in at least one bit. Then the file block in G
that this bit is a part of does not lead to the same result block for F and G if
the same anonymizing blocks are chosen. However, if we fix this result block
from G as XG, the probability of XG occurring in S simply by coincidence is
at most |S|2−128×1024×8. Notice that this argument does not hold when G is
stored first, and its blocks are then used as anonymizers for storing a larger
file F . In this case, which can be forced to occur by the user, G can actually
be hidden in S using what could be termed a “steganographic store”.
So we cannot expect specifically chosen blocks sets like S to be mean-
ingless in these strict interpretations of the term. Yet this does not imply a
negative answer to our privacy concerns. In practice, an attacker is not likely
to attain precisely targeted sets like S together with a URL that guides the
retrieval. Before we discuss realistic attacks on the dynamic network below,
we concern ourselves with a static scenario where the attacker gains knowl-
edge of a cache C of blocks without having access to URLs, and wants to
attach meaning to this block set, being interested both in the files inserted
and the order of insertion. This scenario might arise in a search and seizure
or hacking attack, for example. Looking for descriptor blocks is an obvious
attack vector in this case. Recognizing a descriptor block D is easy because
it consists of other blocks’ names. The difficulty lies in finding the three or
more blocks that, combined, form the descriptor block. While a na¨ıve algo-
rithm has to enumerate all triples out of C, thus taking Ω(|C|3) steps, there
is a more efficient approach6: D = X⊕Y ⊕Z is equivalent to D⊕X = Y ⊕Z.
Of course, we do not know D. However, the first 20 bytes of D (as well as
the second 20 bytes and so on) must be a block name if D is supposed to
be a descriptor block. Thereby it is sufficient to generate a table containing
Y ⊕Z for every block pair in C, as well as a table containing N⊕X for every
block name N and every block start X in C, and check for matches between
the two. If C is a closed set that is guaranteed to contain every block that
is mentioned in a descriptor block, we need only look at the first 20 bytes
6We thank Peter Rossmanith for pointing us in this direction.
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of every X. In this case, we can implement the algorithm in O(|C|2) steps.
Otherwise, it might be that the first name in the descriptor block depicts
a missing block and we have to reiterate the process for every 20-bit part
in X, adding a linear dependency on block length. In any case, O(|C|2)
memory units are required. We have implemented the algorithm in the D
programming language [29] and tested it on a static set of 1156 blocks that
the OFF authors had created by hand and distributed as a very early proof
of concept. After a few performance optimizations the program found all 15
hidden descriptor blocks on a standard PC in a few minutes running time.
In order to test a more realistic case, we introduced a client into the live
network with an empty cache and had it accept block pushes to fill up about
4 GB of blocks. We then ran our program on a high performance cluster on
multiple occasions with up to 24 hours time. Because it would have taken
too long to examine all 6553 20-byte ranges in a block, our experiments took
into account only up to 256 of them. Still, we have not been able to identify
even a single descriptor block in the data. Keep in mind that we did not
download or store anything on the client, so we searched in bucket data only.
Moreover, we tried to unwind the order of storing files in the example set
(since we did not find files in the live sample anyway). This can be done by
looking for a file that has at least one uniquely used block in each triple that
belongs to it. Such a file is a candidate for having been stored last. Removal
of this file leads to a clean state before this file had been introduced. New
candidates arise and the whole process can be unrolled recursively. For the
example data set, we have been able to reveal constraints on the order of
insertion for most files, but in the end, 9 files remain such that every file
has at least one triple where every block is shared with another file, though
there are no more identical triples/files. It seems that the authors performed
several manipulations on the block cache after the files had been inserted
such as introducing alternative descriptor block encodings, but we have not
been able to clearly reconstruct the manipulations.
To summarize: In small block caches that contain complete encoded files
descriptor blocks and thus files can be found, yet the working space and time
grow quadratically with the number of blocks considered. It seems to be
very hard, both in terms of running time and probability, to find meaning
in average client buckets. Policy-wise, this implies that hiding URLs when
one holds complete file encodings is not enough to keep an attacker from
identifying the files in a cache, yet on the other hand, it seems hard to
incriminate an OFF user who simply donates bucket space to the network.
Our findings suggest that while there are ways to reconstruct block semantics
and order of introduction, these methods are not very efficient and reliable in
the face of large and incomplete data sets that might have been manipulated.
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We did not find grave privacy threats in maintaining block caches, yet cannot
recommend using local OFF storage for entire files on its own as a measure
for protecting sensitive data. Simple hard disk encryption is more effective
here.
The Intentions of Users
We tried to address the second question and infer the intentions of users on
the live network by introducing a modified client that logged all interactions,
and employing our database of URLs gathered from searches as described
above. We let the client fill an empty cache and recorded about 24000 data
sets including block hash, user ID, time, and type of interaction. We then
matched the block hashes with file names from our URL database and cre-
ated a new database with about 3500 entries including file name, user ID, and
block name. 3% of interactions were downloads, 18% uploads (both pushes
and requested blocks), and 79% accepted block pushes. Of the 149 nodes
that had at least one interaction, the most active node communicated 528
blocks during our experiment. Figure 2.2 shows a histogram of communica-
tion frequency among observed nodes. It stresses the outstanding roˆle of a
few leading nodes during our observation. This prompted us to first restrict
our attention to accepted block pushes, which resulted in the distribution
pictured in Figure 2.3. Interestingly, the order of leading nodes changed
significantly: While the most active node remained the same, the formerly
second most active node is almost invisible now because it mostly received
blocks instead of pushing them. It appears that this node just like our own
had free space in his bucket since the distribution of file names among the
blocks it received is very even. We further examined the blocks pushed to
us by the very active nodes with regard to file names. While all of these
nodes had particular files standing out in the blocks they had pushed to our
client, the effect was most dramatic in the third most active node. The 198
blocks pushed by this node, say X, could be linked to 24 files, yet 162 of the
blocks belonged to one specific file, say F, with the next most prominent file
only matching 3 blocks. This pattern makes it appear highly probable that
X dispersed file F during our experiment. However, this conclusion might be
unjustified: Another node, say Y, shows a similar pattern of pushing many
(42) blocks that belong to F, with the second most prominent file only ap-
pearing 3 times. F actually features highly in most nodes’ statistics. So
although X has the most pronounced preference for F, there might be alter-
native explanations for this behavior. All in all, there are many significant
patterns discernible among our data, which had to be expected since user
behavior has to be expressed in some traffic irregularity. However, even with
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so few nodes, we found it surprisingly hard to clearly identify user intentions,
let alone prove them. These findings have been verified by several similar
observations. While they could still be read as a threat to user privacy, in
the following section it will be shown that this type of behavioral inference
becomes much harder with network growth.
60 80 100
100
200
300
400
500
600
120 14020 400
0
N
u
m
b
er
o
f
b
lo
ck
s
User IDs
Figure 2.2: Interaction frequency per node histogram in the live OFF system
2.3.3 Scaling OFF
An interesting particularity of the DHT built into the OFF system lies in
the fact that each client tries to know as many neighbors as possible, making
the DHT fully connected in theory. To our knowledge, there has not been
a scientific analysis of the scalability of this model. Typical live network
sizes have so far been smaller than 100 nodes. The complexity of the DHT
rules impedes a theoretical analysis or simulation, leaving only the choice of
experiment. In order to get some insight into this matter, we tried to deploy
OFF in PlanetLab. PlanetLab is an overlay testbed consisting of about 1000
nodes at more than 400 research sites at the time of writing, and is widely
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Figure 2.3: Interaction frequency per node histogram in the live OFF system
when restricted to accepted block pushes
used for the test and deployment of massively distributed systems [22]. Nat-
urally, the worldwide distributed nature and size of the project makes node
management nontrivial. After customizing a headless version of the OFF
client and dealing with technical challenges owing to PlanetLab restrictions,
node churn, and on-site security measures, we succeeded in verifying up to
467 PlanetLab nodes running OFF clients at the same time. However, in
our first trials, we had to manually connect clients by adding neighbors and
instructing clients to retrieve neighbor lists from each other. Later on, we
discovered that this process could be automated only by downloading files
in the network since network discovery is piggybacked on the block request
process in the OFF code. Because we did not have time to simulate realistic
downloading behavior on all our clients, we cannot say for sure how well this
method scales in practice. For the network sizes we tried, however, down-
loading files resulted in knowing many neighbors at least for the nodes that
requested many blocks, after the manual bootstrapping process described
above. We therefore conjecture that at a network size of about 500, OFF’s
neighbor management algorithm could deal with realistic usage patterns.
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Current user experience in OFF is hampered by slow-to-never finishing
downloads. Usually, many blocks belonging to a larger file are downloaded
with acceptable speed. In the live network, this might be around 100 KB/s,
while in our PlanetLab network, we even observed initial download rates of
about 1 MB/s. However, in any larger file, there are blocks that cannot be
found quickly in the network, and often, downloads never finish in the live
network. A simple thought experiment shows why this has to be the case:
If 100 nodes each contribute, say, 2 GB of space for buckets7, we have only
200 GB of space for blocks, not counting initial random seed blocks8. What
is more, traditional DHTs such as Kademlia [85] replicate content on many
nodes. This can also be observed in OFF:
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Figure 2.4: Block frequency histogram for PlanetLab OFF system on March
26, 2009 at 17:42:59: 379 nodes after storing and dispersing 684MB of data
Figure 2.4 shows the distribution of block frequency in our PlanetLab
experiment for 379 nodes after storing and dispersing 684MB of data. Fre-
7These numbers represent estimated orders of magnitude for the live network.
8Observe that although each file block is reconstructed from three stored blocks, only
one new block is stored for each new file block in the system.
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Figure 2.5: Block frequency histogram for PlanetLab OFF system on March
26, 2009 at 19:04:11: 376 nodes after downloading 682MB of data
quencies vary between 1 and 43, median frequency is 22 IPs per block. The
large number of blocks only present on one node can be attributed to the
initial seeding of three random blocks per node and the limited network con-
nectivity at this point. Figure 2.5 depicts the situation about an hour later
after we downloaded a large file to a random node in the network. There
have been significant shifts: The downloaded blocks have spread throughout
the network, typical frequencies range from 1 to 75, with one block being
replicated 105 times. The median is at 23 now. Because we initially set
cache sizes to 1 GB per node, we can assume a total storage volume of 379
GB. Dividing this by 684 MB of data results in a theoretically possible av-
erage replication of about 554, so there is no displacement pressure at all.
Unfortunately, we could not observe the effects of pushing more content into
our artificial network due to time pressure and technical problems. However,
continuing our above line of thought, it is evident that with high node churn,
high replication rates are necessary to ensure block availability. Even if we
assume a very conservative replication factor of 4 for example, only 50 GB of
content space remain in our thought experiment. Unfortunately, the amount
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of content that is witnessed by a URL to have been dispersed into the net-
work far exceeds these estimations: Adding the file sizes of all 3781 URLs
we have been able to find in the network yielded a total data amount of
445,507,663,784 bytes. That is, at least 445 GB of data have been dispersed
into the live network since its inception, whereas the average online space is
probably less than 200 GB. Clearly, there has to be some displacement of
blocks. While it is still unclear how exactly the displacement process takes
place in practice, we observe that a system like OFF has to limit content
uploading or grow fast enough, in terms of nodes and thus space, that this
massive displacement is unnecessary, or at least occurs in a way that reflects
the usefulness of a block in some way. Also, these observations suggest a
DoS attack: A powerful attacker might simply spam the network with use-
less blocks, thereby displacing real content. On PlanetLab, all our downloads
finished, but we still observed a dramatic slowdown towards the end of the
download process. A CD image of about 682 MB size took about 20 minutes
to download on PlanetLab. It appears that OFF’s central usability dilemma
at the moment could be mitigated simply by adding more nodes (or less con-
tent). It is an interesting open question whether in a truly popular network
the race between adding storage space and content could be won.
Finally, we aimed at replicating the logging attack described above in
the larger PlanetLab network. In some sense, the conditions here were even
more conducive to a successful attack because we had control over the entire
network. In particular, we knew beforehand the behavior that we wanted to
observe the effects of: In the PlanetLab network, with 268 nodes that were
known to be online to our logging client, we downloaded the 714,407,936
byte file F10-i686-Live.iso at the same time from two random hosts (plan-
etlab2.eurecom.fr and peeramidion.irisa.fr). Furthermore, after increasing
local bucket size from 1024 to 2048 MB on our logging client (making space
for block pushes, as above), we dispersed the 705,380,352 byte file elive-
1.9.14-unstable.iso from peeramidion.irisa.fr. A total of 1473 block transport
observations involving 258 nodes have been made. Of these, 1421 have been
blocks sent by the logging client, and only 52 accepted block pushes. So ob-
viously, our chances of clearly identifying the uploader were rather slim. The
small number of accepted block pushes could be attributed to a combination
of factors: Obviously, the network comprised more nodes now. Unlike in the
live network, there had still been enough distributed bucket space available
in the network, the connectivity might still have been impaired, and possibly
the size of our bucket did not significantly increase bucket radius—again,
in comparison to the amount of free space available on the network. This
thinking suggests that bucket space scalability not only effects efficiency and
reliability, as outlined above, but might be an important factor in maintain-
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ing privacy as well. Although the dispersing node leads the accepted blocks
statistics with 6 blocks, the next nodes in the activity ranking contributed
4, 2, and 2 blocks, the other 38 blocks coming from distinct nodes. This can
hardly be considered proof for uploading a file, especially because in a real
network, we have to expect lots of concurrent activity going on that might
blur distinctions. Moreover, there has been little to no node churn in our
artificial network that might complicate matters even more. Looking at the
blocks sent by our client might seem more promising in order to identify
the downloaders. Yet a similar picture emerges. Although the downloading
nodes lead the statistics with 32 and 28 blocks requested, the distance to
the next most active nodes is not very significant: They follow closely with
21, 17, 17, and then several times 16 blocks. Figure 2.6 visualizes the entire
data set. In both cases, we might well infer some hypothesis, but it appears
difficult to claim reasonable suspicion, for example.
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Figure 2.6: Interaction frequency per node histogram in the PlanetLab OFF
system restricted to downloads
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2.3.4 Conclusion
We have examined the Owner-Free File System as a promising candidate for
a world library. Its philosophical underpinnings resemble our motivations to
some degree. While a working network client exists, the actual network is
very small and hardly usable at this point due to poor block availability. Our
findings show that this is unavoidable under the current circumstances be-
cause dispersing too much content forces block displacement. In an artificial
network at PlanetLab with larger distributed space we observed a relatively
high block replication rate, which should guarantee high block availability
even in the face of node churn. Thereby, we expect that if more space were
available in a larger network, this hitherto problematic aspect of OFF might
simply disappear. However, it seems hard to predict the growth rates of
block space versus content when many users join the network. This is an
interesting topic for original research.
In examining privacy aspects of OFF, we first tried to reconstruct meaning
from static block sets. Although this is possible in some specific cases, we
did not succeed in proving that some file was part of a realistic block cache.
Looking further at actual network communication showed a similar trend:
Because there is nothing hidden in OFF’s brightnet approach, we can simply
passively monitor blocks passing through a client and combine this knowledge
with URLs collected by some other means. However, both in the small live
network and a larger but more predictable PlanetLab network, this approach
yielded hypotheses, but no reliable evidence for alleged user behavior. In total
we find that OFF seems to strike an acceptable balance between usability
and privacy. Surprisingly, we find that not only is increasing the number
of nodes promising in order to improve user privacy, but so is increasing
the amount of distributed storage, at least with respect to uploading. So it
appears that possibly, a larger number of users would address a number of
concerns with the current OFF system all at once. Moreover, switching to
encrypted communication by using HTTPS instead of HTTP would provide
simple but effective protection against local eavesdroppers.
With regard to scalability, our findings are encouraging, but still can-
not rule out that the proprietary DHT employed might show some scale
limit. Unfortunately, this is very hard to verify unless one actually builds
a huge network because the DHT’s complex behavior makes it hard to gain
insight by simulation or analysis. This suggests two possible pathways for
the project: Firstly, one might simply attempt to quickly reach critical mass
through publicity efforts. However, this approach is risky because unforesee-
able behavior and errors might surface when the network grows very large.
A more reliable approach, to our mind, lies in rebuilding OFF from sim-
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ple, well-understood, and tested components such as standard DHTs. In the
following chapter, we will address properties of such components that are
important for privacy-sensitive applications like OFF.
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Chapter 3
Privacy and Security Aspects of
Distributed Hash Table Design
Thirty spokes meet at a nave;
Because of the hole we may use the wheel.
Clay is moulded into a vessel;
Because of the hollow we may use the cup.
Walls are built around a hearth;
Because of the doors we may use the house.
Thus tools come from what exists,
But use from what does not.
[133, verse 11]
3.1 Introduction
The concept of Distributed Hash Tables (DHTs)—also known as Structured
Peer-to-Peer Systems or Content Addressable Networks (CAN)—arose when
at least four similar networks were proposed at about the same time in
2001 [109, 88, 117, 146]. The basic premise of these networks, in opposition
to unstructured peer-to-peer systems like Napster or Gnutella [100], is that
both peers and content are mapped to a common address space by some hash
function, and the structure of the network is a function of the content of this
hash space, potentially supplanted by some extra randomness. Because we
assume the hash mapping to be (pseudo) random, this typically distributes
both content and network management evenly among peers. This makes it
possible for every node to keep a small amount of network state only, typ-
ically at most O(logn) units, where n is the size of the network. At the
same time, access to any content in the network can be guaranteed with low
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(O(logn) steps) communication overhead, at least in theory, that is, when
we abstract from node churn or targeted attacks. Because DHTs tend to be
symmetric in the sense that no node plays a central roˆle with high probability,
they lend themselves to ensuring robustness by redundancy, and are there-
fore considered well-protected against random failures. For a more in-depth
account of DHTs, see, e.g., Part III of Steinmetz’ and Wehrle’s monograph
“Peer-to-Peer Systems and Applications” [129].
Because of these promising features, DHTs have become an integral part
of many massively distributed systems in recent years. The Kademlia [85] de-
sign has proven particularly successful in practice, e.g. for distributed track-
ing in the Bittorrent file sharing protocol, or searching in the eMule/aMule
file sharing applications. This has inspired a lot of very recent research into
its less obvious properties (e.g. [138, 128, 28]).
In the context of this thesis, we might think of DHTs as a set of simple and
successful mechanisms for distributing information access. This information
might reach from basic network information (what nodes are there and how
can we reach them) [138, 92, 108] over search queries and file descriptors as
in the aMule case, up to entire documents. In the OFF System described
in Chapter 2, the blocks that constitute the building blocks for documents
are held in a DHT-like structure, though as detailed in that chapter, OFF is
atypical in that each client tries to keep track of the entire network.
In any case, there is a multitude of potential uses that a DHT might
be put to in a world library. However, though DHTs’ robustness against
random failures has been well researched, and there have been some efforts
to examine attacks that aim to disrupt the entire DHT, there has been much
less investigation into the security properties that we need to address if we
want to preserve privacy in the face of attacks, especially when combined
with the enormous network growth typically found in massively distributed
systems such as world libraries. This chapter aims to close this gap, or at
least narrow it down to a set of discrete, well-defined issues. We identify two
main strands in these prying attacks: The primary information leakage in
the DHT itself that might enable an attacker to gain knowledge of what was
searched by whom, and the damage that might ensue when an attacker is
able to bias lookup results. To see the security hazard in the second case,
consider an example: A DHT might be used as a network information service
for an anonymization network. In this case, the attacker might be able to
make participants favor nodes controlled by him as anonymizers. Obviously,
this would defeat the purpose of the entire anonymization service.
We begin by defining our DHT model and the range of threats considered
in our attacker models. Then, after reviewing related work, we combine
probabilistic analysis and simulations to explore the effect of targeted attacks
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on the security and anonymity of DHTs and potential countermeasures. To
begin with, we prove that earlier approaches cannot scale securely with the
size of the network. We go on to improve upon these methods with a step-
wise introduction of protection measures whose novel combination is shown
to prevent eclipse attacks effectively even in the face of massively scaling
networks. We then discuss passive attacks and consider ways of countering
information leakage. Before we conclude, we examine the effect of even more
powerful attacker models and show that the lookup process we propose leads
to asymptotically optimal path lengths in a general network model.
3.1.1 DHT Model
A DHT-based lookup service has the following properties:
1. Every data item d is mapped to an ID from an identifier space K using
a standard hash function H that is assumed to be one-way.
2. Each node v is assigned an identifier ID(v) ∈ K. Unless stated
otherwise, we assume that ID(v) cannot be chosen freely but is dis-
tributed uniformly alongK. This might be achieved by setting ID(v) =
H(EID(v)), where EID is a so-called external identifier that is sup-
posed to be bound to actual real-life entities. EIDs might consist of
IP addresses, public keys verifiable through a web of trust, or similar
hard-to-forge data. The security of such EIDs is out of scope here, but
pointers can be found in the literature on the Sybil attack (see below).
3. There is a distance metric onK that defines the distance d(i, j) between
any two IDs i and j.
4. At any time, every ID x has a unique node Resp(x) that is responsible
for x. Usually, this is the node whose ID is closest to x in the distance
metric.
5. Every node v in the DHT has a finger table of neighbors, that is other
nodes whose IDs and IP addresses it keeps track of. This neighbor
table follows DHT-specific invariants.
6. A lookup for a data item d is carried out by routing in the DHT in
order to find the IP of Resp(H(d))
7. Routing is performed by querying neighbors. Usually, a node would
query directly for H(d), to which the neighbor should respond with the
IP and ID of one of its neighbors that is even closer to H(d), unless it
is responsible for H(d) itself.
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8. There are protocols for joining and leaving of nodes. These ensure that
after a join or leave the properties 4 and 5 are still invariant and every
node can still be found by routing.
When we describe our approach to DHT privacy and security protection,
we begin with a simple Chord-like DHT, and start building protection mea-
sures on top of it in order to reach the required properties. Chord [88] has
been chosen because of its simplicity, and, most notably because its finger
table entries are deterministic in the sense that there is exactly one correct
neighbor for each finger in a given DHT. Moreover since the Chord distance
metric is directed, there is asymmetry in the sense that a node does not usu-
ally belong in the finger tables of its neighbors. We will use the first property
to restrict malicious behavior in Section 3.3.4, and the second one against a
stronger adversarial model in Section 3.5.2. Still, both our protection mea-
sures and scalability bounds, especially outside of these two sections, carry
over to a very generic class of DHTs. For example, the results in Section 3.3.2
have serious implications for the security of Kademlia [85].
3.1.2 Attacker Model
Since assuming a global attacker that can observe all communication in the
network seems unrealistic both from the perceived attacker situation on the
Internet today and from our choice of possible protection measures1, we
consider a local attacker. That is, the adversary is able to observe the traffic
of a portion of the network (e.g., your local ISP) and at a fraction of nodes
that it operates or controls. Typically, we will model this by assuming a fixed
fraction f of colluded nodes. On the other hand, we think it realistic to expect
attackers to be active in the sense that they may delete, modify or generate
messages in the network. In the classification proposed by Raymond [110],
we therefore assume an internal, active, and static attacker, unless otherwise
stated.
Naturally, we can not exhaustively state what an attacker could possi-
bly do to disrupt a DHT. We focus on protecting the search process for the
following reason: for both finding and inserting content, we typically look
up the nodes responsible for this content in the DHT. Once they are found,
we may directly communicate with them, practically limiting exposure to
attacks carried out by the responsible node itself since there are no more
intermediaries, and we can protect against external attackers using encryp-
tion. In the context of our application, this puts the focus on two main lines
1See Chapter 1 for additional rationale why we choose to exclude such very powerful
attackers from our examination.
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of attack: Firstly, active eclipse attacks, where the attacker tries to make a
searcher find invalid content by making him look up a seemingly responsi-
ble, yet colluded, node. This is particularly insidious in the case of a DHT
meant to distribute network information, say, in an anonymity network. If
the attacker can make the victim look up only colluded nodes, he can ar-
range for the searcher to perform all his anonymization efforts using attacker
nodes and so defeat protection altogether, without the victim ever noticing
the attack. Secondly, if we want to conserve privacy, it should be a general
goal to avoid or dampen the effects of information leakage. This translates
into passive attacks, where colluded nodes combine their knowledge to link
searched content to the searching node.
There are two further general attacks on networks that could also be used
to heighten exposure to eclipse or information leakage, apart from simply
impeding network performance: Sybil attacks [42, 74, 77, 33] and denial-of-
service (DoS) [11]. Both attacks are well-researched for a very broad class of
networks, and while for both there has not been a consistent solution, there
is an abundance of proposals and design principles that try to defend against
them. Therefore, we restrict the scope of this chapter pertaining to these
two attacks to cases where they allow for easier achievement of eclipse or
information leakage and otherwise refer to the ongoing research elsewhere.
Though we use the standard assumption that an attacker should not
be able to break cryptographic primitives, in Section 3.5.2 we look at the
possibilities of a more powerful adversary that can choose freely their ID,
and thus their position in the DHT.
3.2 Related Work
Since the DHT concept emerged in 2001, the literature on the subject of
DHT security is comparatively new in general. In 2002, Sit and Morris
published some “Security Considerations for Peer-to-Peer Distributed Hash
Tables” [123]. This paper outlined quite a few potential attacks and potential
safeguards, yet remained purely descriptive, refraining from any quantitative
analysis.
Also in 2002, Castro et al. published a visionary paper on “Secure routing
for structured peer-to-peer overlay networks” [16]. Therein, they laid the
foundations for the status quo in DHT routing security that has remained
fundamentally unchallenged until today. Among other results, they introduce
the paradigm of independent paths to counter the kind of active attacks on
routing first described by Sit and Morris and central to our investigation.
Variations on this theme form the basis of many later methods for securing
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DHTs [124, 92, 6]. Yet, in Section 3.3.1 we show that this idea is destined
to fail when networks grow arbitrarily large, before introducing alternative
methods that do scale. Furthermore, their routing failure test prefigures
our finger table bounds checking. A notable difference is their choice of
recursive vs. iterative routing, which we refute for the following reasons:
Firstly, recursive routing allows for DoS attacks with very small effort from
the attacker. It has been shown by Borisov et al. [11] that DoS attacks applied
in anonymous communications considerably reduce the anonymity provided.
We consider the increased potential for DoS attacks in recursive approaches
too big a threat to ignore. Secondly, we will use the added control we gain
over the course of the search through iterative routing in our protection
measures. Even without considering adversarial behavior, recent real-world
DHT implementations like the KAD network emphasize iterative routing
because it avoids losing lookup messages [128].
Hazel, Wiley, and Wiley introduced “Achord: A Variant of the Chord
Lookup Service for Use in Censorship Resistant Peer-to-Peer Publishing Sys-
tems” [64], which might be thought of as an early shot at a world-library-like
concept. While its simplicity is alluring, it shares the reliance on recursive
routing, and thus the obvious weaknesses against active attacks with many
of the approaches discussed here.
In 2004, Srivatsa and Liu gave both quantitative analysis and experimen-
tal results for a number of threats to structured peer-to-peer systems, as well
as some pointers to their remedy [124]. Actually, their analysis begins sim-
ilar to ours in Section 3.3.1, yet they do not acknowledge the implications
on protection scalability. Our DHT model description has been informed by
their formal model.
In 2005, Nikita Borisov published his PhD thesis on “Anonymous Rout-
ing in Structured Peer-to-Peer Overlays” [13]. Besides introducing a novel
method of assessing anonymity, he proposes gaining sender anonymity in
DHTs by combining random walks with recursive routing. Together with Ja-
sonWaddle, the same author also published a technical report on “Anonymity
in Structured Peer-to-Peer Networks” [12] with a similar gist. This one stands
out because it makes some interesting observations on the implications of free
adversarial placement on passive attacks. They complement our remarks in
Section 3.5.2 on active attacks in a similar setting. Our focus is different
from these and similar works [96, 23] in that we aim to defend against active
attacks with priority. While we do strive for sender anonymity, we believe
that it is unachievable in a holistic view (cf. [104]) when we cannot keep an
adversary from eclipsing large parts of the network.
In 2006, Awerbuch and Scheiderler [4] published a theoretical approach
to building a scalable and secure DHT that might potentially solve many
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of the problems we are facing in this application. A multitude of active
attacks are actually proven to be impossible on this structure, even though
passive information leakage attacks are not considered. Unfortunately, the
downside of the formal approach taken is that the high level of vantage
does not allow for instant practical implementation. In fact, the authors
“believe that designing such protocols is possible though their design and
formal correctness proofs may require a significant effort.” [4]. Even if this
belief is correct, it is foreseeable that it would lead to a very complex system,
hard to analyze and implement correctly, while in the networking/anonymity
community we observe a trend towards security by simplicity.
Guiseppe Ciaccio’s work on “Recipient Anonymity in a Structured Over-
lay” [24] aims to keep the responder to a query in a DHT anonymous es-
pecially from the querying node. While at first, this seems an orthogonal
concern to our protection measures against third parties, it is readily under-
stood that the concept cannot be upheld when we prefer iterative routing
over recursive queries. The reasons for this important decision have been de-
scribed above. There are other, more technical reasons why Ciaccio’s ideas
conflict with ours (finger table checking, for example), and so we have to
contend that in our setting, it seems we have to sacrifice the possibility of
keeping the identity of nodes that hold DHT content secret from the nodes
that request or store it. We note that in our opinion, this is not too great
a loss in exchange for protection of the security and privacy of the lookup
against third parties, especially when we consider a DHT as a system for
looking up nodes in the first place. It is very important, however, to con-
sider this aspect in decisions as to how we intend to use DHTs in a world
library, say, and refrain from directly storing content in a DHT that might
incriminate the storing node owner. The OFF system’s approach of storing
semantically neutral data blocks might be one possible way of dealing with
the problem. A different, though possibly prohibitively expensive way out
could be adding another layer of indirection, say through tunneling, in order
to achieve responder anonymity in a different way.
Salsa [92] is a DHT which has been specifically developed for anonymiza-
tion networks. Identities are based on hashes of the nodes’ IP addresses and
are organized in a tree structure. Redundancy and bounds checking are used
while doing lookups in order to prevent malicious nodes from returning false
information. According to simulations, the scheme prevents attackers from
biasing the path selection as long as the fraction of malicious nodes in the
system does not exceed 20%. This scheme, too, falls prey to our proof of
non-scalability.
Additionally, analysis on “Information Leaks in Structured Peer-to-peer
Anonymous Communication Systems” by Mittal and Borisov [86] has shown
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that even in smaller networks Salsa is less secure than previously thought:
Because defending against active attacks requires higher redundancy, this
directly increases the threat of passive attacks since a small fraction of mali-
cious nodes can observe a significant part of the lookups. This compromises
anonymity by leaking information about the initiator and the nodes involved
in a tunnel. Unfortunately, this principal attack befalls every multiple-hop
DHT, and thus cannot be avoided by our approach entirely. Still, we discuss
some remedies and alternatives in what follows.
In 2007, Baumgart and Mies [6] proposed several improvements for Kadem-
lia [85] in order to make it more resilient against attacks. The improvements
are threefold: using cryptographic puzzles for restricting node ID generation;
sibling broadcast for ensuring replicated data storage; using multiple disjoint
paths for node lookups. While the first two measures are out of our scope,
our results indicate that the latter method will break down asymptotically.
In 2008, Chris Lesniewski-Laas introduced a one-hop DHT that defends
against Byzantine (internal and active) attackers [74]. Unfortunately, its
assumptions are rather strong: In a network with n honest nodes and m
honest edges, it can tolerate o(n/ logn) attack edges (from honest nodes to
attacker nodes), while requiring its nodes to keep track of routing tables
containing O(
√
m logm) entries per node. While claiming to provide “the
first sublinear solution to this problem”, the paper “leaves open the question
of whether a structured DHT with logarithmic table size can be made highly
Sybil-resistant (. . . )” [74]. We are going to answer this question affirmatively
in what follows, while allowing even a constant fraction of colluded nodes,
which translates to a superlinear amount of attack edges.
In 2009, Westermann et al. [138] studied default Kademlia behavior w.r.t.
colluding nodes that answer queries with the malicious nodes closest to the
searched-for ID. Their finding is that, due to redundancy, the fraction of
malicious nodes found in queries is not significantly larger than the overall
fraction of malicious nodes in the system. The simulations, however, have
only been conducted up to 50, 000 nodes.
Finally, Panchenko, Rache, and Richter [108] have applied research used
for the preparation of this chapter to network information services for anonymi-
zation networks. We use some of this material, including figures, to make
the more general points on DHT privacy in this chapter.
3.3 Active Attacks
Herein we examine the effects of adversarial efforts to bias the lookup path
and results, as well as devise a stepwise strategy to counter these efforts.
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3.3.1 Redundancy through Independent Paths Does
Not Scale
A na¨ıve implementation of searching for an ID x in an environment with
a fraction f of collaborating adversarial nodes has success probability ps =
(1 − f)l, where l is the length of the search path, when we assume the
adversary to either simply drop requests in a DoS fashion or return false
information such as claiming to be the owner of x. Because l has to grow
larger with the size of the network, typically on the order of log(n) [83],
this success probability approaches zero for growing networks asymptotically,
when f is, say, constant. Thus, we can say that, under this simple attack,
the na¨ıve implementation does not scale.
Of course, earlier scholarship [92, 16, 6] has recognized this problem. As
a solution, redundancy in the form of several search paths has been intro-
duced without fail. The cited papers all try to ensure routing towards x
using multiple, preferably independent, paths. This is in itself a difficult
proposition because the structure of DHTs usually leads to path convergence
in a lot of cases, and quite some auxiliary constructions have been taken to
still ensure independence. Yet, even when we assume independent paths, the
redundancy required endangers scalability in the limit:
Theorem 1 The number of lookup paths required to reach constant success
probability ps against a constant ratio f of active attackers is at least
ps
(1−f)l ∈
nΩ(1) for path length l ∈ Ω(log n).
Proof. Let Ii be a random indicator variable that takes the value 1 if path i
is attacker-free, and 0 otherwise. A single path i is free from attackers with
probability (1 − f)l, thus EIi = (1 − f)l. Then
∑α
i=1 Ii is a variable that
counts the number of successes out of α paths, and
ps = P [
α∑
i=1
Ii ≥ 1] ≤ E
α∑
i=1
Ii =
α∑
i=1
EIi = α(1− f)l
by the Markov inequality and linearity of expectation. Notice that we have
not made any assumptions about path independence.
Solving for α, substituting Ω(log n) for l and assuming f, ps constant
yields
α ≥ ps
(1− f)l ∈ (1/(1− f))
Ω(logn) = nΩ(1).

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With simple greedy routing—always querying the best known node with
respect to distance to the target— the lower bound of Ω(log n) path length is
true of a large class of small world networks, including all the DHTs we know
of, as well as skip graphs [83]. Therefore, the theorem shows that the number
of independent paths needed to route successfully with some fixed probability
grows at least polynomially in n. This is exponentially greater than, e.g., the
number of neighbors a node has in the most common DHTs. Thus, even
in the first step of routing, we rapidly run out of independent possibilities
to choose from with growing networks. The aforementioned research efforts
[92, 16, 6, 138] experimentally evaluated their approaches in environments
incorporating between 10,000 and 100,000 nodes. While their results suggest
practicability in this range, the above considerations show that we cannot
expect this to hold up when the networks grow larger.
One might argue that a constant fraction of collaborating nodes assumes
a very strong adversary, and there have been results that only work with
fewer adversarial nodes [74], yet there are multiple reasons why we consider
this adversarial model here: Firstly, most practical suggestions to solving
the problem have assumed fixed percentages of malicious nodes [92, 16, 6].
Secondly, real world phenomena like botnets suggest that we might have to
deal with strong attacks like this. Thirdly, as we will show in the next section,
we can do better. Instead of striving to make paths independent, we want
them to work together in order to reach x more reliably.
3.3.2 Redesigning Redundancy: Aggregated Greedy
Search
Most of the approaches studied before make use of redundant independent
lookups. This leads to a convergence on many paths. Therefore we follow
another approach: instead of performing independent lookups, we propose
to use an aggregated search which combines the knowledge available on each
of the parallel branches. We call this aggregated greedy search.
It proceeds as follows. In each round the searching node v chooses the α
nodes closest to the goal x that he is aware of and queries them for x. The
search terminates when after one iteration the list of α closest peers has not
changed. The owner of x (the peer which is closest to the searched ID) is the
result of the query.
Interestingly, this description fits the behavior described in the Kademlia
specification [85] rather closely. And indeed, it has been demonstrated [138]
that Kademlia, and thus aggregated greedy search, works well against an ac-
tive adversary in networks of up to 50, 000 nodes. Unfortunately, we believe
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that these results can be explained by the overwhelming redundancy em-
ployed for a relatively small network. This is because the following theorem
shows that even aggregated greedy search, on its own, does not scale.
Theorem 2 Let α be an upper bound to the number of nodes queried in
every round, β the maximum number of neighbors accepted from any one
queried node, and f the fraction of corrupted nodes, a constant. Then,
as long as (αβ)O(logα) ⊆ o(n), there is an attack that makes the success
probability of the search approach 0 in the limit. For example, this holds
when α, β ∈ O(logn).
Proof. The attacker proceeds by returning as many different corrupt nodes as
possible, in the order of proximity to the search goal x, until only corrupted
nodes are queried. If this attack succeeds, the attacker then has complete
control over the course of the search.
Let Bk = {b1, . . . , b|Bk|} the set of corrupt nodes that the searching node
v knows after k rounds, and say that the bi are ordered by proximity to x,
that is for all 1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ |Bk| we have that d(x, bi) ≤ d(x, bj). Notice that
the attacker, by returning the collaborators closest to x first, can make sure
that this order is static during the whole search.
Let us first find an upper bound to the number of rounds k required such
that |Bk| > α w.h.p.. Of course, this presupposes that fn, the number of
colluded nodes, exceeds α in the first place, a trivial side condition that is
guaranteed in the long run by the assumption (αβ)O(logα) ⊆ o(n). We will
then use this upper bound to show that it is unlikely that by this time, an
honest node has displaced a colluded one.
W.h.p. asymptotically, at least one corrupted node is queried within the
first round if either α or β is in ω(1). Let us assume this for the moment.
Moreover, without loss of generality (w.l.o.g.) β ≥ 2 because for β = 1, aggre-
gated greedy search degenerates to simple greedy search with redundancy α,
and Theorem 1 can be applied to yield the claim because (αβ)O(logα) ⊆ o(n)
implies α /∈ nΩ(1).
Let us further assume that in this phase, every colluded node that v learns
of will be queried since v does not yet encounter any honest nodes closer to
x than bα. We will justify this in short. It is then easy to see by induction
that in each following round, |Bk| at least doubles because every corrupted
node will return at least two more hitherto unknown corrupted nodes. Thus,
|Bk| > α for some k ∈ O(logα) w.h.p.. Of course, this is a very weak bound,
but it will suffice for our needs here.
During these k rounds, v will learn of at most (αβ)O(logα) nodes altogether.
Assuming randomly distributed nodes (both honest and corrupted), the size
54
of the set Y of honest nodes closer to x than bα is Pascal distributed with
parameters α and f , and expected value E|Y | = α(1/f − 1). Each of these
nodes has probability (αβ)O(logα)/n of being known to v before the attacker
can make v query only corrupt nodes after k rounds. As in the proof of
Theorem 1, define indicator variables Iy that indicate this event for every
y ∈ Y . Then, the expected total number of nodes in Y that v learns of in
time k is
E
∑
y∈Y
Iy = EE
∑
y∈Y
Iy = E
∑
y∈Y
EIy = E|Y |EIy.
Employing the Markov inequality just like in Theorem 1 shows that this is
an upper bound to the probability that v gets to know any node that is closer
than bα before the attacker can make him query only corrupt nodes:
P [
∑
y∈Y
Iy ≥ 1] ≤ E|Y |EIy ∈ α(1/f − 1)(αβ)
O(logα)
n
⊆ o(1)
when (αβ)O(logα) ⊆ o(n). This proves the first claim in the non-constant
case.
In the case that both α and β are constant, getting to know at least
one corrupted node w.h.p. might take a little longer, say log(log n) rounds.
Asymptotically this dominates the remaining O(logα) rounds to make |Bk| >
α. With the same reasoning as above, the success probability is now at most
(αβ)O(log logn)/n, but for α, β ∈ O(1), this is also o(1).
Finally, when α, β ∈ O(logn), the success probability is
(αβ)O(logα)
n
=
(logn)O(log(log n))
n
=
eO(log
2(logn))
n
⊆ o(1).

The theorem suggests that for all realistic choices of search parameters,
a rather simple eclipse attack defeats aggregated greedy search (and thus,
Kademlia) in the limit. Notice, however, that this attack is based on the
malicious nodes knowing the target x even in the first round. In order to
overcome the problem, we propose to hide the search value.
3.3.3 Hiding the Search Value
We modify our search as follows. As before, in each round v queries the α
known nodes closest to x. However, instead of asking for x, v requests the
entire finger table (FT) from each of these nodes.
55
Let α = log2(n) from now on. This value maximizes redundancy and
might still be adjusted in real applications to avoid excessive network load.
In the first step, v queries all peers in his FT. Each of the retrieved FTs
contains log2(n) entries. These are all aggregated, and the best (closest to
the searched-for ID) log2(n) of them are selected for the next iteration. Only
hitherto unqueried nodes are requested to provide their finger tables. The
search continues until the top list of log2(n) closest peers is not modified at
the end of an iteration. The closest peer is then returned as the result of the
search.
We choose to retrieve the full FT because of the following reasons: First,
we get extra redundancy while executing the lookup; Second, the queried
node does not know which ID v is interested in. This keeps the adversary
from responding with targeted malicious nodes close to the searched-for ID.
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Figure 3.1: Malicious nodes respond with random collaborating nodes
Figure 3.1 shows our simulation results for aggregated greedy search while
trying to hide the searched value. All plots include 95% confidence intervals.
Malicious nodes provide only other malicious nodes in their FTs. Since the
searched ID is not known, malicious nodes deliver random colluding nodes.
Perhaps surprisingly, the rate of found malicious nodes appears to approach
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2f − f 2. This phenomenon might intuitively be explained as follows: Since
the first round is unbiased, we can expect a rate of f colluding nodes queried.
However, when we assume that all these nodes reply with malicious nodes
only, while the honest nodes’ finger tables still have attacker ratio f , the new
attacker ratio in the replies from round 1 is expected to be f · 1+ (1− f)f =
2f − f 2. Notice that from the second round on, all queried nodes have an ID
bias towards x. While the attacker nodes still answer with random colluded
nodes, the honest nodes’ finger tables, due to the exponentially increasing
finger distances in Chord (see Section 3.3.4 for more details), contain more
nodes in their own vicinity, and thus in the vicinity of x. Thus, the attacker
quickly loses its advantage in the course of the search process and may not be
able to increase the attacker ratio from the second stage on. This explanation
does not yet give a full formal model for the search process, still it might help
account for the results we have seen.
While these results are a step in the right direction, they are far from op-
timal on their own. Moreover, there is an even more efficient attack against
this search strategy. Because the course of the search process in future iter-
ations depends on previous rounds’ query results, colluding nodes can com-
bine their knowledge in order to approximate the searched-for ID. Because
the Chord ring is directed, the searcher will not ask for IDs lying “behind”
the search value x. Thus, the attacker can estimate an interval for the value
of x by looking at which colluding nodes the searcher knows of but does
not query. It can then return malicious nodes which are as close as possible
to the searched-for ID. Figure 3.2 shows the simulation results for the case
when the malicious nodes estimate the queried ID. Note that this is only
possible after the second search iteration since the first round does not leak
information about the direction of search. We see that even having only 10%
of malicious nodes in the system leads to more than 50% attacker success.
Thus, even aggregated greedy search without explicitly telling the search
value does not offer satisfactory protection: an adversary can still learn x,
eclipse the searcher and guide him into a cluster consisting of malicious nodes
only. Hence, we need one additional building block.
3.3.4 Bounds Checking in Finger Tables
The success of the active attack described in the previous section is based
on the fact that colluding nodes can provide arbitrary nodes in their FTs.
In order to mitigate this, we utilize properties of DHTs with a deterministic
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Figure 3.2: Malicious nodes respond with collaborating nodes closest to the
search value
choice of peers in the FT. Chord is one such DHT. In Chord, the ith finger
of a node with ID m is supposed to point to the node whose ID is closest to
m+2i−1. Since v knows the IDs of the nodes it queries, it can calculate these
values and compare them to the actual finger table values in the responses
it receives.
Since we already retrieve and have the entire FT, the check can be per-
formed without transmitting any additional information. In contrast to ear-
lier approaches [92, 16], we do not only check the end result of the query,
but all the intermediate steps. As our evaluation shows, this significantly
improves success probability.
We perform bounds checking in finger tables as follows: Each peer calcu-
lates the means of the distance between the actual IDs in its FT and optimal
IDs (as if all IDs would exist). Let us denote this as a mean distance. In
order to decrease variance on this mean distance estimation, it might be de-
sirable to also take into account other finger tables as the peer learns these.
Furthermore, the mean distance is multiplied with a FT tolerance factor.
The search is now modified as follows: in each iteration, FTs are only
accepted and considered for finding the log2(n) nodes closest to x if they
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Figure 3.3: Finger table analysis: malicious nodes change 10 entries
pass the FT test. The test yields a positive result if and only if the mean
distance of the considered FT is smaller than the average sampled mean
distance multiplied by tolerance factor.
Figures 3.3 and 3.4 show differences in the mean distances of honest and
colluding nodes FTs. While Figure 3.3 shows the case where malicious nodes
change 10 honest nodes entries to malicious, in Figure 3.4 only 4 entries are
changed. Malicious nodes change their entries from the actual value to the
malicious node closest to this value. This is an optimal strategy for them to
make the FT look plausible when subjected to our test.
Since there are 100, 000 nodes in the considered scenario, on average there
are 16 nodes in each finger table. We see that the mean distance is clearly
distinguishable when many FT entries are changed, and becomes closer and
less distinguishable when only a few entries are modified. While this finding
seems obvious, the actual values give an intuition to which extent the FTs of
malicious nodes can be changed while still successfully passing the FT check
test.
Figure 3.5 shows the influence of FT tolerance factor on false positives
and the fraction of malicious nodes found, when the adversaries make their
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Figure 3.4: Finger table analysis: malicious nodes change 4 entries
FT contain only colluded nodes by changing entries to the next colluded node
where necessary.
In contrast to that, Figure 3.6 shows the factor influence on the fraction
of malicious nodes found, when the attackers detect the search directions
and intelligently replace a predefined number of honest nodes with colluded
ones, starting with the honest nodes closest to the searched area. Again,
the malicious node closest to the selected honest node is selected for this
operation. The other entries remain unchanged. This increases the plausi-
bility of modified FTs. We can see the dependency of the attacker success
rate on both the FT tolerance factor and the number of replaced entries. A
staggering finding here is that replacing all the entries in the FT with the
closest malicious nodes does not help the adversary to significantly increase
the rate of its nodes in the end results of the queries, even if the searcher
were to believe all these FTs. This means that as long as the FTs look
plausible, the attacker is not able to significantly bias search results, even
if he could manage to provide the searcher with malicious nodes only. This
provides a clue into why the combination of aggregated greedy search with
finger table checking provides such strong protection against eclipse attacks:
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by forcing the attacker to conform closely to the original structure of the
DHT and aggregating results, we can always correct misleading information
by taking into account FTs of close-by honest nodes. We conjecture that
this combination could probably deter eclipse attacks even without hiding
the search value, but we keep this feature because it does not cost us any-
thing at this point and might be useful against information leakage attacks
(see Section 3.4 for more details).
In Figure 3.7 we additionally assume that the adversary knows the FT
acceptance threshold of the users. As in the previous plot the attacker learns
the search value. He replaces FT entries in the search direction, but only
up to the acceptance threshold, so that his FT would be still accepted by
an honest user. This is the strongest adversarial behavior that we tested be-
cause it seems hard to conceive of an easy way for the attackers to optimize
their responses beyond this point. The optimization problems arising for the
attacker are complex to describe precisely, let alone solve efficiently. Cer-
tainly, there is ample space for future research in this direction. Because the
structure of DHTs like Chord seems so benign to our approach, we conjecture
though, that the effect of further optimization, at least when restricted to
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Figure 3.6: Factor influence on success probability (2)
efficiently solvable problems, will be limited.
As our simulations show, bounds checking on FTs is a very promising
technique. A FT tolerance factor of 3 seems to be a good choice for the
considered setup. As Figure 3.7 shows, virtually no FTs of honest users are
rejected any more when we apply this factor. Furthermore, malicious nodes
are not able to increase their rate in the system while changing more than 3
entries (see Figure 3.6). Knowing the searched ID and the acceptance thresh-
old of the honest users does not help malicious nodes to increase their rate
in the queries beyond their rate in the system as Figure 3.7 suggests. Castro
et al. [16] give a very precise statistical method for optimizing the tolerance
factor when checking end results. Their method could easily be adapted to
our FT checking. Yet, we find that simply selecting an ad hoc value such
as 3 works astonishingly well in our simulations. Further inspection of Fig-
ure 3.6 helps us to understand this: We are relatively free to minimize the
false positive rate by choosing a rather high tolerance factor because there is
no need to strictly minimize the false negatives. This is because as long as
the false negatives remain below the actual attacker rate f , it simply makes
no sense for an attacker to lie about its FT.
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Figure 3.7: Malicious nodes know the FT acceptance threshold
Performing the FT check test based on the mean distance only is cer-
tainly not optimal. Possibly, other strategies would yield even better results.
In fact, the whole armament of statistical classification techniques can be
imagined to be brought to use. However, the results show that even our
simple strategy works well in the considered simulations. That is why we
leave improvements in this direction for future work. See Section 3.5.2 for
arguments why research in this direction might still be worthwhile. One pos-
sible improvement might be to consider only or to weight additionally those
entries which are leading into the direction of search and are considered for
the top list of log2(n) best nodes seen so far. If an adversary is able to learn
the search direction, these are the first entries he would replace.
As the results show, our protection works well against an active attacker.
On a side note, a further protection layer could be established by cross-
checking FTs: Especially in the later stages of a search, it should often occur
that the searcher can detect a modified FT entry because it already knows
from another honest node that there is a node closer to the optimum FT
position. When the searcher checks that this closer node actually exists, this
amounts to a proof for incorrect behavior on the part of the colluding node.
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Using public key signatures and a trust system, one might even think of using
this proof for generally excluding attacker nodes. We leave the details and
evaluation for future work.
Most of the simulations provided here have been conducted with 20% of
malicious nodes in the system. However, we have also conducted simulations
for 1,10, and 40% of colluding nodes, respectively. Due to the similarity of the
results we forgo their presentation in this chapter. An actual implementation
of our approach is undertaken by Arne Rache at the time of writing.
3.4 Passive Attacks
3.4.1 Information Leakage
All known DHT-based information distribution services, including our ap-
proach, are endangered by passive information leakage attacks [86, 35]. These
attacks generally use the fact that searching in a DHT entails talking to
many colluded nodes in the process. The redundancy typically used to pre-
vent active attacks only makes this exposure worse, so that we may even
talk about a trade-off in protection against active and passive attacks [86].
Through these search queries, the attacker learns who is searching what, ei-
ther directly or through linking multiple queries. Measures such as recursive
routing or hiding the search goal may make this information harder to ob-
tain or less precise, yet in general cannot keep the adversary from gaining
significant insight. This kind of information can then be abused in a number
of subtle ways that are out of scope in this context. In fact, the types of
attack possible have become a very active research topic lately [86, 35]. Still,
in all of these attacks the worst case that can arise is the attacker gaining
precise knowledge of the link between searching and searched node. Though
this is clearly not desirable, there is little research about the consequences
in real-world systems. Arguably, we are worse off if the attacker controls the
node found, as is the goal of eclipse attacks. That is why so far, we have
placed emphasis on avoiding this kind of attack.
Interestingly, the amount or precision of information an attacker can gain
by finding out even the exact looked-for node very much depends on the
kind of information stored in the DHT, and thus the application. This is
because in our scheme, the adversary is not going to learn the precise ID
searched for, but in the worst case the node that is responsible for this ID.
This information degrades privacy the more the fewer information is stored
in the DHT. In Section 3.4.2 we present a general observation that allows us
to make this information even more fuzzy for an observer, regardless of the
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application.
Still, in the extreme case, when every node stores exactly one data item,
this attack potentially reduces user privacy very much. However, we know
of only one practical application where this is typically the case: network
information services. In this application we typically look for random nodes
in the network. Section 3.4.3 shows an alternative approach for this case
that trades in some degree of protection against eclipse attacks to achieve
minimal information leakage.
3.4.2 Increasing Attacker Uncertainty
We have analyzed the fraction of malicious nodes in the log2(n) best nodes list
depending on the iteration. When we think of looking for random nodes in
an anonymity network information system, we might fancy to also accept the
nodes found in the intermediate steps of a search as onion router candidates in
order to mitigate bridging and fingerprinting attacks. However, as the results
in Figure 3.8 show, this is not a good idea. Still, the fraction of colluded nodes
in the last search iteration corresponds to the fraction of malicious nodes if
we only look at the single result of the search (cf. Figure 3.7). Therefore, it
makes sense to consider the entire list of log2(n) nodes closest to the search
value instead of the single value only as possible routers. This increases the
uncertainty of an attacker about the nodes which are known to honest users
(as their number is significantly increased), and thereby helps counter passive
information leakage attacks in this case.
In general, when we aim to store and lookup any kind of information on
nodes, this finding can still help us to mislead an attacker: It effectively says
that w.h.p., we do not only find the correct node responsible for x in a search,
but the correct log2(n) nodes closest to x. Using an estimate of node density
in the DHT, we may then avoid looking for x directly, but select an y slightly
“beyond” x, such that Resp(x) is still among the log2(n) nodes closest to y
w.h.p.. If it isn’t (which might be the case when the nodes around y are
unexpectedly dense), the searching node may still backtrack a little since
it has requested full FTs along the way. When implemented carefully, this
technique should considerably mitigate information leakage effects.
In the next section we look at a much more radical information leakage
avoidance technique. Unfortunately, its range of applications is limited to
looking for random nodes, as in a network information system for anonymity
networks. Accordingly, we treat the technique with a focus on this applica-
tion. In a more general setting, it might still be useful for tunneling DHT
lookups through a random node.
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Figure 3.8: Fraction of malicious nodes depending on the iteration
3.4.3 Random Walks in Network Information Systems
The information leakage in our lookup algorithm lies in giving away the
search goal x, or, more precisely, the link between the searching node v and x.
Through hiding the search value (cf. 3.3.3) and taking into consideration the
entire top list at the end of the search (cf. 3.4.2) we have already introduced
some uncertainty for the attacker. In general, a good way to raise the entropy
for the attacker in our choice of circuit nodes is to simply conduct multiple
searches, sequentially or in parallel, thereby learning a greater part of the
network. Moreover, such behavior, especially when conducted by a great
many nodes, may serve to obscure the links between searchers and searched-
for nodes.
Although these measures may foil most attacks in practice, and though it
is not clear how much an attacker could profit at all from knowledge gained
this way, it would obviously be preferable from a theoretical point of view if
we could provably avoid passive attacks altogether. Hence we looked for an
entirely different approach that cannot give away a search goal since there
is no such thing. A random walk (RW) through the network is a relatively
obvious solution.
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In a RW, we randomly select one of our neighbors, ask this neighbor for
its finger table, and, again, randomly select one of its neighbors, iterating
this method for a path length l. On average, l should at least be log2(n)
since this ensures that each peer in the DHT can be reached by the RW.
Intuitively, there is as little information leakage in this process as we can
reach when routing in a DHT, since there really is no direction to the search
that might be leaked.
It is clear that this approach can be combined with our finger table check-
ing to keep the attacker from presenting arbitrary neighbor tables and thus
hijacking a path with certainty. It is less clear what to do when we have
to reject a finger table. When we only walk one path, we have no choice
but backtrack one or multiple nodes in our path and choose again. The
extreme case of this method is simply starting anew. Actually, this is cer-
tainly the most secure method. Simply backtracking one node opens the
door for an elaborate DoS attack: an adversarial node a might have a high
rate of attacker neighbors in a plausible FT. This is certainly possible for a
few attacker nodes by chance or when assuming the more powerful attacker
model from Section 3.5.2. By collusion, the attacker nodes next in the walk
know that a came before them and simply reply with an implausible FT. The
searcher will then go back to a and try again, repeating the useless travel
back and forth w.h.p.. Of course, one might think of elaborate schemes to
avoid such traps, like progressive backtracking. Yet, our design principle of
security by simplicity cautions against introducing unnoticed attack possi-
bilities through complexity. There might be another option when we try to
achieve redundancy through multiple parallel walks: Replacing the implau-
sible FT by a plausible FT from another thread. At first glance, this option
seems appealing because it removes the “offender” and all its predecessors
from the search while keeping the degree of redundancy. Notice, however,
that we lose the independence of paths in this approach. This is easy to see
when we imagine an extreme case: Replacement of all but one FT in the
last step of the random walk. In this case, all results stem from the FT of
one node. A detailed analysis of the properties of this random process seems
involved. We leave it for future work and continue our analysis of a simple,
non-redundant random walk.
In spite of FT checking, we have to assume a different ratio g of colluding
nodes in attacker finger tables that is potentially higher than f , especially
when we allow for arbitrary attacker positioning as discussed in Section 3.5.2.
Let pf(l) = 1 − ps(l) be the probability of selecting a colluded node after l
steps. Obviously, pf(1) = f . Moreover, for l > 1, pf(l) ≥ gpf(l − 1) +
fps(l−1), because colluded nodes answer with a fraction g of colluded nodes,
while correct nodes still return a colluded fraction f . Solving this recurrence
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relation using geometric series yields pf (l) ≥ f 1−(g−f)l+11−g+f which can easily be
checked using induction. We observe that with growing path length, this
probability rapidly becomes f
1−g+f . Figure 3.9 plots this predicted attacker
success rate for increasing g with f = 0.2.
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Figure 3.9: Theoretical lower bound to attacker success on random walks for
attacker ratio f = 0.2 and increasing attacker finger table corruption g
Unfortunately, this strong dependency on g turns out to be problematic
in the real world because it compounds with another property of RWs. Fig-
ure 3.10 displays the results of our simulations. Specifically, we look at the
impact of the tolerance factor when the attackers know this factor and try
to modify as many fingers as possible without being detected. Unlike ag-
gregated greedy search, where it is important for the attacker to change FT
entries close to x, with RW, every FT entry is equally important and so it
becomes a good adversarial strategy to adapt as many entries as possible,
which translates into making small changes first. We can see that already
with a factor of 3, the attackers can modify about 12 out of 16 FT entries on
average, which, consistent with our prediction, translates to almost 50 per
cent attacker success for f = 0.2. The sweet spot seems to be at a lower
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factor here, but even at factor 2 we get a failure rate of about 0.35, with
already significant false positives.
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Figure 3.10: Tolerance factor influence with random walk
This shows that using RWs for network information is only advisable when
the active attacker ratio is low and information leakage is a serious issue. On
the other hand, the results highlight the effective protection against an active
adversary that is provided by our improved aggregated greedy search scheme
with finger table checking.
We have been thinking of a combined approach that might bring to-
gether the advantages of both aggregated greedy search (security against
active attacks) and RWs (security against passive attacks). Unfortunately,
the straightforward idea of searching for a few rounds and then randomly
switching the goal x seems to have limited applicability, as Figure 3.11 sug-
gests. It makes clear that during the search process, the ratio of colluding
nodes in the total set of nodes surveyed, as well as in the closest nodes top
list is rising rather quickly in the first few steps, a finding echoed in Fig-
ure 3.8. It is mitigated only later on, when the search converges towards x.
By this time, however, the attacker already has a pretty good idea of the
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search direction.
3.5 Further Observations
We shortly discuss some miscellaneous concerns and possible solutions in this
section without giving them a fully formal treatment.
3.5.1 Bootstrapping Process
So far in our analysis we have assumed correct bootstrapping of the network.
Under this assumption we have shown that our approach is able to provide
an adequate protection to its users: the fraction of malicious nodes found
in lookups is not significantly larger than the overall fraction of malicious
nodes in the system. Additionally, we have introduced some measures for
countering passive attacks. Here we discuss how the users can overcome the
problem of malicious nodes while joining the network, i.e. bootstrapping.
We assume that before joining the network a user knows a few DHT
members and at least one of them is not colluding. This assumption is
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meaningful since it is unlikely that any approach would work if only malicious
nodes are known to the user. The user generates its ID (which might be a
hash value of its DHT public key, say), and asks the known DHT members to
execute bootstrapping for this ID. Each of these nodes executes the lookups
(in the way we proposed before) for the entries in the new nodes’ FT and
communicate them to the new node. The new node selects the entries closest
to the optimum values. Notice that even a majority of evil nodes could not
break this process, as long as there is one honest node whose searches succeed.
After the stabilization protocol has been run [88] the new node is a regular
member of the network. By basing bootstrapping (and maintenance, which
can be conducted in a similar manner) on our secure routing primitive, we
are confident not to introduce additional security hazards.
3.5.2 Arbitrary Positioning of Malicious Nodes
So far we have considered the case where the malicious nodes are uniformly
distributed along the ID space. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss
the realism of this assumption and possible measures for enforcing it. Still,
we briefly look at a stronger adversarial scenario: what if the colluded nodes
could arbitrarily position themselves within the whole ID space of the Chord
ring? Clearly, if this were to work instantly, or the DHT remained very stable
for a long time, the adversaries could eclipse a single user if they knew his ID.
We consider the case where they do not have a concrete victim but are rather
interested to be in as many paths in the system as possible, thus trying to
get as much information as possible about the whole system.
At this point, the asymmetry of our DHT distance metric comes into play:
It assures that, typically, a (colluded) node is not a neighbor of its neighbors.
Thus, it is a nontrivial feat for the adversary to construct positions for its
nodes such that their FTs may contain many of their own while still being
plausible. Again, a presumably hard problem arises for the attacker, and
we can only give a simple solution that we believe close to optimal, without
being able to prove this conjecture.
From our point of view, the so-called bisection would be a very good at-
tacker positioning strategy in this case: recursive division of the ID space
into two equal parts (halves) and placing the malicious nodes on the dividing
points. This would lead to “perfect” FTs in the sense that the mean dis-
tance would rapidly approach zero with an increasing number of malicious
nodes. Figure 3.12 shows simulation results for this scenario. Even though
the results are worse than in the regular case where we assume that arbi-
trary positioning is not possible, the rate of colluding nodes found in random
searches is still fixed with increasing network size, while non-linearly depen-
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dent on the total attacker rate. Accordingly, when the attackers are able to
mount this kind of attack, we can say that our approach as it is still scales,
yet is more vulnerable to high attacker rates.
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Figure 3.12: Arbitrary positioning of malicious nodes
Moreover, having perfect finger tables is also conspicuous and could be
detected by the honest users. A more involved FT classification technique
might prove valuable in this setting. Note also that malicious nodes cannot
easily improve their positioning by being only close to the optimal value—
this would work only for a few of them. The rest would have “regular” FTs.
It is not hard to come up with slight modifications to our DHT scheme
that foil the simple bisection attacker plan. For example, we might think of
requiring the ith FT entry of node m to be strictly greater than m + 2i−1,
instead of just greater or equal. This already breaks symmetry. However, it
seems much harder to come up with a DHT structure that can actually be
shown to allow for no or not much advantage through any chosen positioning.
The concept of expander graphs [89] might be instructive here: informally
speaking, in an expander graph, all node sets within some size bounds—such
as the set of colluding nodes—have many neighbors outside of the set itself.
Unfortunately, there are at least two questions in our application: Firstly,
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how do we deal with neighbors that are not within the set, yet close to some
element of the set? Secondly, how can we ensure that the underlying graph
of a DHT conforms to these expander properties? Law and Siu [73] have
begun research in a similar direction, though it is not immediately clear how
their high level paper on “Distributed Construction of Random Expander
Networks” can be applied in our setting.
We have to leave this fascinating research topic for future work, yet re-
mark that it is a standard problem in security research that unknown attacks
can never be ruled out in general. In light of our findings, we therefore pro-
pose our protection measures as the most secure and scalable approach to
truly distributed information distribution that we know of; and while we
cannot guarantee the absence of unthought-of attacks, the above considera-
tions inspire us with confidence that our approach will defend against them
gracefully, or at the very least can be adapted to do so easily.
3.5.3 Path Length in Aggregated Greedy Search
Manku, Naor, and Wieder have analyzed the path lengths for greedy and
neighbor-of-neighbor (NoN) greedy routing on a number of peer-to-peer net-
works including Chord [83]. NoN greedy routing means that in every step, the
searcher asks all neighbors of the current next node for their neighbors and
then makes the NoN closest to the goal2 the new current node. Their find-
ings are surprising: While deterministic routing networks (like a determinis-
tic Chord network that contains all possible nodes) have diameter Θ(log n)
and greedy routing is optimal, randomized routing networks (like random-
ized Chord) have diameter Θ(logn/ log logn), and while greedy routing takes
Ω(log n) hops w.h.p., NoN greedy routing routes in an asymptotically opti-
mal Θ(logn/ log log n) hops. It is interesting to see where aggregated greedy
routing falls.
The authors’ lower bound proof partitions the lookup into two phases
that they handle separately. In the first phase, a theorem by Coppersmith,
Gamarnik, and Sviridenko [27] is invoked to decrease the L1-distance from
the goal 0 to e
√
logn or less in O(logn/ log log n) steps. The second phase
then takes care of the remaining distance, and simple greedy routing suffices
to keep the same time bound here.
Because aggregate greedy routing is obviously no worse than simple greedy
routing, we only have to check the first phase. Coppersmith et al.’s proof is
fairly technical and involved, yet a careful rereading shows that it holds for
2Differing from our terminology elsewhere, we adopt the authors’ notation in this sec-
tion: W.l.o.g., we route from x to the goal at 0
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aggregate greedy routing as well. NoN routing is only used implicitly in their
Lemma 6.1. Therein, it is shown that any node x with sufficient distance to
the goal 0 is connected to a node within a small ball V (x) around the goal by
a path of length two w.h.p.. This is done by first showing that x has many
neighbors y closer to 0 than x, and then bounding the probability that any
such y has no neighbors in V (x). This argument can be used for NoN routing
because NoN routing finds optimal paths of length two. It can also be used
for aggregate greedy routing because of the following reasoning: If x is in
the top log n list at any routing step, all its neighbors are considered. Each
one of them, say y, has the chance to be in the new top list, unless there is
an even closer node y′ to replace it with. Because y′ is closer to 0 than y,
it has a neighbor in V (x) with at least the same probability as y. That is
why we expect aggregate greedy routing to perform at least as well as NoN
greedy routing, which has been shown to be asymptotically optimal, in the
small-world percolation networks considered by both groups of authors, and
thus in most randomized peer-to-peer networks.
3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter we have analyzed security issues in DHTs that threaten pri-
vacy and proposed protection measures to defend against these attacks. Al-
though we acknowledge and defend against passive information leakage at-
tacks aimed at direct data collection, our focus has been on active eclipse
attacks in particular. This is because we believe that, informally speak-
ing, when you cannot trust in who you talk to directly, there is little point in
guarding the conversation from being overheard. Or, more technically speak-
ing, when an attacker can make the searcher ask a node for data that is being
controlled by the attacker, he learns the connection between the searcher and
the data looked for, even when the system is perfectly secure against passive
attacks.
After showing that earlier methods cannot scale reliably in the face of
eclipse attacks, we introduced aggregate greedy routing in combination with
hiding the search goal and FT bounds checking to overcome these attacks.
Our scheme prevents malicious nodes from biasing the node lookups, while
requiring each node to know only a small subset of the network. Unlike
earlier approaches, the approach is highly scalable and does not require to
trust any third party.
Just like every other known approach that does not lead to a full net-
work view, our approach is still susceptible to information leakage attacks.
Even though their practical seriousness and impact are under research, we
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hardened our system against these attacks by hiding the searched goal and
learning a significantly large part of the network. If information leakage is
intolerable in a given scenario, we propose the alternative approach of ran-
dom walks, while acknowledging that this method does not feature equally
strong protection against active attacks and can only be used to find ran-
dom nodes. In practice, a more typical way of dealing with the problem
would be to continually perform a number of lookups. This way, a greater
part of the network is known over time, making fingerprinting-type inference
significantly harder for the attacker. In the limit, this poses the question if
gossiping-like alternatives that lead to discovery of the entire network can
be made scalable, and adversarial exploitation of a full network view as in
intersection attacks can be prevented. These alternatives have to be fur-
ther researched in order to find the most appropriate solution for privacy
preserving distributed information storage.
In further observations, we discussed the often-overlooked aspects of boot-
strapping and vulnerability against more powerful attackers that are able to
choose their position in the DHT, and finally noted that aggregated greedy
search is asymptotically optimal with regard to average path length in a very
general network model.
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Chapter 4
Learning Unique Hitting
Sets—Bounds on Anonymity
Who recognizes his limitations is healthy;
Who ignores his limitations is sick.
The sage recognizes this sickness as a limitation.
And so becomes immune.
[133, verse 71]
4.1 Introduction
Privacy is one of the main concerns for world libraries as defined in Chap-
ter 1. In fact, if we could ignore this central issue, we could choose from
a wide range of proven solutions (cf. [100]). Anonymity, “the state of be-
ing not identifiable within a set of subjects, the anonymity set” [63], is one
key ingredient to achieving or preserving privacy. This is because, obviously,
information becomes personal only when it can be linked to a person or a
group. In a world library, as an open distributed system, we can anticipate
that an adversary will often be able to observe information, such as commu-
nication patterns, that would hurt the privacy of users, were he able to link
this information to these users.
In order to achieve the state of anonymity, we use anonymity techniques.
We will define this term more formally in 4.1.1 to stand for a so called MIX
network that cloaks the relationships between a set of senders and a set of
receivers. Note, however, that this model can be used to make statements
about any form of anonymity with the above definition. For example, we may
look at an entire world library as an anonymity technique that is supposed
to hide the relationship between, e.g., the set of its users and the set of
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media requested from or donated to the library. On the other hand, an
anonymity technique might be a little building block in a world library, as,
say, a MIX network that obfuscates some kind of communication structure
like, for example, who caches data for whom.
Unfortunately, there are limits to the anonymity that any such technique
may provide. Even when we abstract from the internals of the mechanism and
look at an anonymity technique as a black box, certain inferences are possible
for an adversary who is in a position to monitor the inputs and outputs of
this box. Since we just pointed out that very different situations can be
modeled in this way, general limits to the anonymity of such black boxes carry
over to limits to the anonymity of the people or entities in these situations.
Continuing with the examples above, your Internet service provider might
collaborate with someone offering sensitive information inside the library.
The results below can then be used to show that after you have read a
certain amount of information from this source, the library, however it might
operate, can no longer keep the collaborators from finding out that it was
you who accessed the sensitive information. This, in turn, might inspire us
to loosen the relationship between meaning and participants in the system,
an idea that is the most prominent feature of the Owner-Free File System
discussed in Chapter 2.3.
In this chapter, we show a very general upper limit to anonymity by pro-
viding the first mathematical analysis on the number of observations required
to learn a unique minimum hitting set. Analysing learning algorithms helps
to understand the complexity of hard problems. When solutions to a cer-
tain problem turn out to be learnable in little time, the resulting algorithm
can be employed to solve the problem in everyday applications. In so far,
learnability yields a positive answer to the question of tractability.
Conversely, a system that relies on the intractability of a computational
problem can be proven useless, or at least endangered, by adequate results on
the learnability of that problem. In this chapter, we show how such results
can be used to analyze an anonymity system that relies on the hardness of
the unique minimum hitting set problem. In fact, this so called hitting set
attack [70], which is closely related to the intersection attack [9], sets a limit
to the possible anonymity of persistent communication in any anonymity
system if we follow the well-accepted definition of anonymity as “the state
of being not identifiable within a set of subjects, the anonymity set.” [63].
Thus, we begin with a short introduction to the general field of anonymity
techniques in order to justify our model. George Danezis and Claudia Diaz
have recently published a comprehensive “Survey on Anonymous Commu-
nication Channels” [31], to which we refer the interested reader for further
details.
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4.1.1 Anonymity Techniques
Using information technology, it is possible to manage personal and business
data efficiently, i.e., to access data from everywhere and at any time, to store
and replicate it without loss, and to distribute it to a number of people.
However, nothing is for free. With the number of information technology
application areas, the risk of misuse of the available data is also increas-
ing. Therefore, security techniques have the goal to help users enforce their
security interests under potential threats [38, 55].
Confidentiality is one of the basic security requirements [38]. It requires
that information be exclusively available to the intended participants only.
We know two main approaches to evaluate the security strength of techniques
providing confidentiality: the information theoretic approach and the com-
plexity theoretic approach. In the information theoretic approach, one has
to show that there is no information leakage, implying that the adversary
cannot learn anything new about the confidential information [55, 120, 121].
In the complexity theoretic approach, information leakage is tolerated, but
learning is required to be infeasible [58]. Thus, learning algorithms play a
vital roˆle in the area of security. They allow for evaluating the strength of
security techniques.
In the area of confidentiality, learning algorithms are mainly used to eval-
uate cryptography [112], that is, to evaluate the content of exchanged data.
In this context, we usually refer to the classical Shannon-Weaver information
model [120, 121]: We assume that information is exchanged between a sender
and a recipient by applying the right encoding and decoding algorithms. Ac-
cording to this model, information is protected by using encryption with an
unknown secret key (and, of course, decryption on the other side). Thus, the
aim of the adversary is to learn the secret key.
However, the information concept of the Shannon-Weaver model does not
reflect the current state of confidentiality requirements because the model
does not cover all the sensitive information that has to be protected. For
instance, a user—say Alice—might want to request data from an HIV/AIDS
database. Even though the exchanged data may be protected by encryption,
the relation of Alice to the HIV/AIDS database is open to the adversary.
This information can simply be revealed on the network level by logging
the network address information (traffic information). Having access to this
information, the adversary can build a profile of Alice, e.g., how much and
with whom Alice communicates frequently.
To protect traffic information, a number of anonymity techniques have
been suggested [17, 18]. All of these obey the aforementioned definition:
Anonymity is the state of not being identifiable within a set of subjects, the
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anonymity set. An anonymity technique—a so called MIX server—collects
n data packets from n distinct users, changing the appearance and order of
the packets so that no outsider can link an incoming packet to an outgoing
packet. Thereby, this mechanism conceals the specific communication rela-
tionships of Alice amidst the additional traffic of the other users. Following
this general description we model the attacker and the anonymity system
so that the attacker observes and records all sets of incoming and outgoing
packets to and from a MIX if Alice has contributed with a message. Hence,
the following abstract model can be used:
Assume (cf. [70]) that the set of all peers is A = {1, 2, . . . , N} and that
Alice frequently communicates with a subset B of A, say B = {1, 2, . . . , m}.
Then the aim of the adversary is to learn B. Since Alice uses a strong
anonymity technique, the elements of B are only observable in terms of
anonymity sets (more precisely, multisets), i.e., the adversary makes obser-
vations Oi consisting of one element from B and n − 1 additional elements
from A, with multiple occurrences possible. For the adversary, given only
one observation and uniform distribution, each element of Oi is equally likely
to be the real peer partner. To learn B, the adversary collects a number of
observations O1,O2, . . . ,Ot and tries to determine the set of real peer part-
ners. The resulting question is: what is the minimum number of t required
to learn B?
It is commonly believed in the security community1, as well as intuitive
from an information theoretic point of view, that non-uniform distributions
only ease the task of revealing that piece of information, as they eliminate
maximum uncertainty. Thus, the uniform distribution model is not only
mathematically smooth but can also be justified as a kind of worst-case
scenario for the adversary, provided that the anonymizer cannot adapt to
the model or algorithm used by the adversary.
In earlier scholarship [70], a learning algorithm based on the computation
of hitting sets has been suggested and evaluated using simulations, and it has
been shown that B is exactly learnable if the learning algorithm can identify
a unique minimum hitting set.
Definition 3 Given a family of multisets O1,O2, . . . ,Ot, a set B is called a
hitting set for this family iff, for every 1 ≤ i ≤ t, we have that |B ∩ Oi| > 0.
We call B a unique minimum hitting set for O1,O2, . . . ,Ot iff |B| < |C|
holds for every other hitting set (with respect to the same family) C 6= B.
1“All other things being equal, anonymity is the stronger, the larger the respective
anonymity set is and the more evenly distributed the sending or receiving, respectively, of
the subjects within that set is.” [103]
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Informally, B can be identified as the unique minimum hitting set of
O1,O2, . . . ,Ot because B has to intersect (hit) all observations by construc-
tion. For the sake of simplicity, the number of peer partners |B| is often
assumed to be known. In this work, we give a theoretical analysis by assum-
ing the same parameters N := |A|, m := |B|, and n := |Oi|. Surprisingly,
our results do not depend on any knowledge of N , m or n.
4.1.2 Related Work and Contributions
Although much has been written about attacks on anonymity systems (see,
e.g., [86, 5, 1, 76, 142]), most of these attacks rely on system specifics such
as network structure or communication timing. There are few results that
hold in a general setting like the one described above. This general MIX
model was introduced in 2002 by Kesdogan, Agrawal, and Penz [68], who also
discovered the disclosure attack along with it . This attack unveils Alice’s
communication partners with certainty, yet relies on solving instances of an
NP hard problem. George Danezis’ 2003 statistical disclosure attack [30, 34]
relaxes this requirement, yet its hypotheses are only correct with a certain
probability. The hitting set attack and statistical hitting set attack have
been discovered by Kesdogan and Pimenidis in 2004 [70]. These attacks
are more efficient in terms of the number of observations needed than their
disclosure attack counterparts. However, they rely on being able to solve the
NP hard hitting set problem. Herein we show that learning algorithms can be
employed to efficiently solve the problem instances arising in this attack, and
analytically bound the number of observations necessary in order to break
anonymity. A preliminary version of these results has recently been accepted
for publication [69].
The chapter at hand consists of three main results, the first of which
is a bound on the number t of observations required for B to be a unique
minimum hitting set, rather than just a hitting set of possibly minimum size,
for O1, . . . ,Ot. This is followed by two learning algorithms with distinct
objectives. The first, simple one shows that the unique minimum hitting set
can be learnt efficiently and within a small number of observations in many
settings. The second, more involved one relies on more preconditions and is
highly likely to take more time, but it is able to prove its hypothesis correct
with high probability.
It is easy to see that B can be identified in the limit even if m is not
known: A text that contains all observations contains a multiset {i, . . . , i}
for every i ∈ B as well. A simple learning strategy is to present the set of
all i’s seen in such pure observations. If m is known, this strategy is even
self-monitoring. As such pure observations will only occur extremely rarely
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in practice, however, such a learning algorithm seems to be rather useless.
Knowledge about the underlying probability distribution leads to much faster
algorithms [145].
When using more sophisticated learning algorithms, the correctness of a
hypothesis H can be shown by proving that H is a unique minimum hitting
set [70]. Whereas it is easy to verify that H is a hitting set, determining
uniqueness is known to be NP-complete. Until now, this has been an obstacle
for the hitting set attack. Exploiting the special structure of the hitting set
instances occurring in this application, however, the second algorithm can
prove uniqueness in linear time.
The following table gives some examples for the numbers of observa-
tions required to reach an error probability of at most 1/100 in each of the
three aforementioned contexts: uniqueness (U), simple algorithm (A1), and
advanced algorithm (A2). The parameters have been chosen to exemplify
practically plausible configurations. On the other hand, the results show
nontrivial dependency upon parameter variation for the derived worst-case
bounds.
m n N U A1 A2
10 20 20000 19 14898 783048
10 50 50000 22 14899 759100
20 50 20000 53 66468 580094
20 50 50000 46 66259 1449190
Note that all three bounds are upper limits on the security of an anonymity
system under varying thread models. From a practical perspective, our re-
sults suggest the following checks in order to evaluate a proposed system:
1. Estimate model parameters, that is, the number of peers N , the typical
number of communication partnersm, and the size of anonymity sets n.
2. Is the computational power of the adversary potentially unbounded or
the unique minimum hitting set instances small or simply structured?
Then it might not be acceptable if a unique minimum hitting set even
exists. Choose bound U.
3. Is the adversary incapable of solving hard problems, but an easily ob-
tained if unproven hypothesis about the communication partners poses
a thread? Choose bound A1.
4. Does the computationally bounded adversary need to prove his hypoth-
esis? Bound A2 applies.
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5. Choose a confidence level, that is, an accepted discovery probability.
6. Evaluate the chosen bound using the parameters numerically or sym-
bolically to find an upper bound to the number of rounds that anonymity
can be upheld.
4.2 The Uniqueness of Hitting Sets
In this section, we show bounds on the probability for B to become a unique
minimum hitting set after a certain number of observations. There are exper-
imental results on the learning speed of the hitting set attack (see, e.g., [70])
and corresponding conjectures, but as of today, there has been no accom-
panying mathematical investigation. Let us first recall and formalize the
objects in question.
Definition 4 Let A = {1, 2, . . . , N}, B = {1, 2, . . . , m}, and let O1, . . . ,Ot
be a sequence of observations, where each Oi is a multiset of size n taken
from A that contains at least one element from B. For any element i ∈ A, Zi
denotes the number of observations containing i. Let ZB and ZA\B be random
variables that have the same distribution as Zi for i ∈ B and i ∈ A \ B,
respectively. Let finally
pA\B := 1−
(
1− 1
N
)n−1
.
Note that pA\B describes the probability that a fixed element from A \B
occurs in a random observation. We are now able to establish the first result.
Theorem 3 The probability that B is not a unique minimum hitting set for
O1, . . . ,Ot is at most
(
N
m
)
exp(− 1
m
(1−m/N)n−1t).
Proof. By construction, B is a hitting set for O1, . . . ,Ot. Let
H := {H ⊆ A ∣∣ |H| = m,H 6= B } =
(
A
m
)
\ {B}.
In order for B to be unique, the family H must not contain any hitting set
for O1, . . . ,Ot. That is, there has to exist an i ∈ {1, . . . , t} for every H ∈ H
such that H ∩Oi = ∅.
Each Oi can be written as {bi} ∪ Ai, where bi ∈ B and Ai is a multiset
consisting of n−1 elements from A. Since H 6= B, there exists an x ∈ B \H .
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The probability for the event [bi = x] is 1/m, and the probability of choosing
an element from A \H when choosing from A is (N −m)/N . Hence,
Pr[H ∩ Oi = ∅] ≥ 1
m
(N −m
N
)n−1
.
This implies
Pr[∀i H ∩Oi 6= ∅] ≤
(
1− 1
m
(N −m
N
)n−1)t
≤ e− 1m (1−m/N)n−1t
and, finally,
Pr[∃H ∈ H ∀i H ∩ Oi 6= ∅] ≤
(
N
m
)
e−
1
m
(1−m/N)n−1t.

4.3 A Simple Learning Algorithm
The unostentatious algorithm investigated in this section tries to learn B
by combining the elements i ∈ A of the largest Zi into a hitting set for the
present sequence O1, . . . ,Ot of observations. We prove that with a certain
probability, this method suffices to learn B within a bounded number of
observations. The following lemma establishes two expectations required for
future calculations.
Lemma 1
EZB =
t
m
+ t(1− 1
m
)pA\B
EZA\B = tpA\B
Proof. Each Oi can be written as Oi = {bi} ∪ Ai for some bi ∈ B and a
multiset Ai consisting of n−1 elements from A. For a single observation Oi,
the probability for some fixed j ∈ B to be bi is 1/m. The probability for j to
be chosen into Ai is pA\B. Adding up disjoint cases and using independence,
we get Pr[j ∈ Oi] = Pr[bi = j]+Pr[bi 6= j] Pr[j ∈ Ai] = 1/m+(1−1/m)pA\B.
By linearity of expectation, EZB = EZj = tPr[j ∈ Oi]. A similar but even
simpler argument shows the second claim. 
Let us define the order ≻ on A in order to ease the descriptions of our
algorithms. Notice that ≻ is constructed to be total.
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Definition 5 For i, j ∈ A and their respective occurrence counters Zi, Zj,
let
i ≻ j ≡ ((Zi > Zj) ∨ ((Zi = Zj) ∧ (i > j))).
Moreover, let i1, . . . , iN be the elements from A sorted according to ≻, or, in
a more formal notation, i1 ≻ i2 ≻ . . . ≻ iN .
Surprisingly, our first algorithm does not even need to know m. Instead,
it just uses a kind of greedy majority vote to compute its hypothesis. There
is, however, no guarantee that it will learn B entirely, unless no subset of B
forms a hitting set for the present sequence of observations.
1. Initially, set t := 0 and Zi := 0 for all i ∈ A.
2. Increase t and read the t-th observation Ot. For every element i ∈ A
that occurs at least once in Ot, increase Zi.
3. Set Ht := ∅. Add i1, i2, . . . to Ht until Ht is a hitting set for O1, . . . ,Ot.
Go to step (2).
We want to show that the hypothesis Ht is likely to be (partly) correct
after a certain number of observations, at least in the case that the (first two
of the) following three conditions hold for an appropriate number c:
P1 ≡ Zi ≥ EZB − c
√
EZB for all i ∈ B,
P2 ≡ Zi ≤ EZA\B + c
√
EZA\B for all i ∈ A \B, and
P3 ≡ for all i ∈ B there is a 1 ≤ j ≤ t such that B ∩ Oj = {i}.
Lemma 2
Pr[P¯1] ≤ e−c2/2,
Pr[P¯2] ≤ e−c2/3,
Pr[P¯3] ≤ m · exp
(
− 1
m
(
1− m− 1
N
)n−1
t
)
.
Proof. The first two claims follow from Chernoff bounds [89, 4.6] because Zi
is binomially distributed. To see the third claim, check that for an arbitrary
i ∈ B,
α := Pr[∀1 ≤ j ≤ t. B ∩Oj 6= {i}] =
(
1− 1
m
(
1− m− 1
N
)n−1)t
and estimate according to Pr[∃i ∈ B. ∀1 ≤ j ≤ t. B ∩ Oj 6= {i}] ≤ mα as
well as (1− β)t ≤ exp(−βt). 
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Corollary 1 Pr[P1∧P2] ≥ 1−exp(−c2/2)−exp(−c2/3) ≥ 1−2 exp(−c2/3).
We first establish a bound for the partial correctness, i.e., that the hypothesis
contains only elements from B.
Lemma 3 Pr[Ht 6⊆ B] ≤ 2 exp(−t(1− pA\B)2/12m2).
Proof. Let c =
√
t(1− pA\B)/2m and apply Corollary 1 to see that P1 ∧ P2
holds with probability at least 1− 2 exp(−t(1− pA\B)2/12m2).
It is obvious that Ht ⊆ B as soon as Zi > Zj for all i ∈ B and j ∈ A \B
since in that case, the algorithm chooses only elements from B for addition
to Ht. Under the assumption that P1 and P2 hold, it hence suffices to have
that
EZB − c
√
EZB > EZA\B + c
√
EZA\B.
Using the expressions for EZB and EZA\B from Lemma 1 as well as some
simple transformations, it is easy to see that this is the case whenever
t >
(
cm
1− pA\B
(√ 1
m
+ (1− 1/m)pA\B +√pA\B
))2
. (4.1)
According to the fact that pA\B < 1, the right hand side of (4.1) is strictly
less than (2cm/(1− pA\B))2 = t. Hence, (4.1) holds for all t. 
In addition, we want to estimate the probability for the algorithm to find
the complete set B.
Lemma 4
Pr[Ht 6= B] ≤ 2 exp(−t(1− pA\B)2/12m2) +m exp
(
− 1
m
(
1− m− 1
N
)n−1
t
)
.
Proof. For a sequence O1, . . . ,Ot of observations, let us call an i ∈ B dis-
pensable if B \ {i} is a hitting set, that is, if there is no 1 ≤ j ≤ t such that
B ∩ Oj = {i}. Moreover, we call B oversaturated if it contains at least one
dispensable element. For some i ∈ B and 1 ≤ j ≤ t, we have that
Pr[B ∩ Oj = {i}] = 1
m
(
1− m− 1
N
)n−1
.
It is hence easy to see that, for an arbitrary i ∈ B,
Pr[i is dispensable] =
(
1− 1
m
(
1−m− 1
N
)n−1)t
≤ exp
(
− 1
m
(
1−m− 1
N
)n−1
t
)
.
There are only two ways for Ht not to equal B: if Ht is not even a subset of
B, or if B contains a dispensable element. Thus,
Pr[Ht 6= B] ≤ Pr[Ht 6⊆ B] + Pr[B is oversaturated].
Using the bounds calculated above and in Lemma 3, the claim follows. 
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In what follows, S denotes the sampling complexity, that is, the number
of observations required to learn B. Formally, S = min{ t | Hτ = B for
all τ ≥ t }. Our algorithm is likely to find B, or a subset thereof, rather
efficiently in many settings. However, there is no guarantee that it will not
abandon a correct hypothesis in the future. In particular, the algorithm is
not conservative. To establish a bound on S, we have to use the bound from
Lemma 4 on infinitely many values.
Theorem 4 Let d1 = (1 − pA\B)2/12m2 and d2 = 1m(1 − (m − 1)/N)n−1.
Then
Pr[S > t] ≤ 2e−d1t/(1− e−d1) +me−d2t/(1− e−d2).
Proof. Lemma 4 implies that Pr[Hτ 6= B] ≤ 2e−d1t +me−d2t. Summing up
for all τ ≥ t yields the claim. 
4.4 An Advanced Learning Algorithm
The aforementioned algorithm may compute a correct hypothesis within only
a small number of observations in many settings, but it is not capable of
proving the hypothesis correct. In opposition to that, our advanced algorithm
is able to check and prove that its hypothesis is correct, but does not work
for ill-conditioned combinations of N , m, and n. These, however, can be
avoided by demanding that, e.g., pA\B < 1/m2. Note that this condition will
be satisfied whenever N is much larger than n and m. For instance, it holds
for the values depicted in the table that concludes Section 4.1.
Let us define three conditions that will be crucial in the development.
For the moment, let c be an arbitrary number and
Q1 ≡ Zi ≤ EZB + c
√
EZA\B for all i ∈ B,
Q2 ≡ Zi ≥ EZB − c
√
EZA\B for all i ∈ B, and
Q3 ≡ Zi ≤ EZA\B + c
√
EZA\B for all i ∈ A \B.
Notice that Q3 syntactically equals P2. We choose another identifier
because a different choice of c results in a different condition in this context.
It will turn out that these three properties ensure thatB is a unique minimum
hitting set for O1, . . . ,Ot, given appropriate values for pA\B and t.
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Lemma 5
Pr[Q¯1] ≤ exp
(
−c
2
3
pA\B
1/m+ (1− 1/m)pA\B
)
,
Pr[Q¯2] ≤ exp
(
−c
2
2
pA\B
1/m+ (1− 1/m)pA\B
)
,
Pr[Q¯3] ≤ e−c2/3.
Proof. The claims follow from Chernoff bounds [89, (4.6)]. 
For the rest of the chapter, let us fix c =
√
6 ln 5/mpA\B. This allows us
to derive the following result, which is necessary to ensure applicability of
our second algorithm.
Lemma 6 If pA\B ≤ 1/m then Pr[Q1 ∧Q2 ∧Q3] > 12 .
Proof. Using the above lemma, we get that Pr[Q¯1],Pr[Q¯2] ≤ 15 . Observe
that c > 3 whenever the trivial condition pA\B ≤ 1/m holds, implying that
Pr[Q¯3] <
1
10
. Altogether, we get the result that Pr[Q¯1∨Q¯2∨Q¯3] < 15+ 15+ 110 =
1
2
. 
The second algorithm is described below. Whereas the first two steps are
exactly the same as in the first method, the Zi are then used for entirely
different computations. Since the Zi are in descending order, h represents
the maximum number of observations that can be explained (hit) when we
replace at least one element of Ht. Thus, if h < t, Ht is the only hitting
set of its size that is able to explain our observations, the unique minimum
hitting set.
1. Initially, set t := 0 and Zi := 0 for all i ∈ A.
2. Increase t and read the t-th observation Ot. For every element i ∈ A
that occurs at least once in Ot, increase Zi.
3. Set Ht := {i1, . . . , im} and h := Zi1 + . . .+ Zim−1 + Zim+1.
4. Output Ht. If h < t, then claim that Ht = B and stop. Otherwise go
to step (2).
Observe that, instead of assuming m to be known, the algorithm can
simply choose the smallest m such that {i1, . . . , im} is a hitting set, just
as in the first algorithm. The following theorem and the trailing corollary
show some conditions under which B becomes a unique minimum hitting set,
where uniqueness follows from a simple counting argument that is easy to
check.
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Theorem 5 Let pA\B < 1/m2 and assume
t >
6 ln(5)m
(1/m− pA\B(m− 1 + 1/m))2 .
In the event that Q1, Q2 and Q3 hold, we have that B is a unique minimum
hitting set for O1, . . . ,Ot. Moreover, the elements in B occur in more obser-
vations than any element from A \B, and every other m-element set H ⊆ A
has
∑
i∈H Zi < t.
Proof. By definition, B is a hitting set for O1, . . . ,Ot. Notice that in par-
ticular this implies
∑
i∈B Zi ≥ t. We will show that replacing even a single
element from B by an element from A \ B results in missing the required
lower bound of t occurrences. This will imply that B can be obtained by
majority voting and that no proper subset suffices to cover all observations.
Thus the claim follows.
To see the statement in question, let us look at an upper bound on the
number of observations hit by m− 1 elements from B and one element from
A \B. Such an upper bound is given by Q1 and Q3:
(m− 1)(EZB + c
√
EZA\B) + EZA\B + c
√
EZA\B
= (m− 1)EZB + EZA\B +mc
√
EZA\B
= (m− 1) t
m
+ (m− 1)t
(
1− 1
m
)
pA\B + tpA\B +mc
√
tpA\B
We want to show that the upper bound lies below t. Equivalently, it
suffices to prove that
mc
√
pA\B
t
< 1−
(
m− 1
mpA\B
+
(m− 1)2
m
+ 1
)
pA\B.
Using pA\B < 1/m2, a simple calculation shows that the right hand side of
the inequality is positive. Thus we have to ensure that
√
t >
mc
√
pA\B
1− ((m− 1)/mpA\B + (m− 1)2/m+ 1)pA\B .
This is equivalent to
t >
m2c2pA\B
(1/m− pA\B(m− 1 + 1/m))2 =
6 ln(5)m
(1/m− pA\B(m− 1 + 1/m))2 .

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Corollary 2 Let pA\B < 1/m2 and assume t > c2m2(1+1/m). In the event
that Q1, Q2 and Q3 hold, we have that B is a unique minimum hitting set for
O1, . . . ,Ot. Moreover, the elements in B occur in more observations than any
element from A \B, and every other m-element set H ⊆ A has ∑i∈H Zi < t.
Proof. Observe that t > c2m2(1 + 1/m) and pA\B < 1/m2 imply
t >
6 ln(5)m
(1/m− pA\B(m− 1 + 1/m))2 .
The claim follows from Theorem 5. 
Let S ′ denote the minimum number t of observations our advanced algo-
rithm takes before it claims that Ht = B. Using the above results, we can
easily derive bounds on S ′ as follows.
Theorem 6 If pA\B < 1/m2, then Pr[S ′ ≥ c2m2(1 + 1/m)] < 12 .
Proof. Combine Lemma 6 and Corollary 2. 
Corollary 3 If pA\B < 1/m2, then Pr[S ′ ≥ kc2m2(1 + 1/m)] ≤ 2−k.
Proof. The claim follows from [116, Theorem 6] if the algorithm is both
conservative and rearrangement-independent. This can be established by
modifying the algorithm so as to use ∅ as its hypothesis unless h < t, that
is, unless the algorithm claims that Ht = B. 
4.5 Conclusion
We have seen that learning algorithms can be used to break anonymity pro-
tocols. Whereas even a small number of observations may give enough infor-
mation to match communication partners, the required computation involves
solving hard problems. Given the chance to make many observations, how-
ever, the instances tend to have a certain structure that can be exploited in
order to find the secret in question efficiently.
Once again, this shows how hard problems can be seen to be tractable—at
least with high probability—in everyday applications, meaning that most in-
stances that occur in practice are not so computationally hard at all. Policy-
wise this implies that it does not suffice to base anonymity or security in
general on the intractability of a computational problem. Instead, we need
to look closer at the hardness of the problem instances arising in the protocol
at hand. This is an approach taken by an active community of researchers in
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the field of exact and parameterized algorithms for hard problems (See, e.g.,
[52] for a survey). Our results argue for a close collaboration with this com-
munity when designing security protocols, in order to forestall unexpected
attacks.
It remains to test the algorithms on data collected in real networks. In
addition, it would be interesting to see lower bounds on the number of ob-
servations our algorithms require.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
Those who wish to change the world
According with their desire
Cannot succeed.
The world is shaped by the Way;
It cannot be shaped by the self.
Trying to change it, you damage it;
Trying to possess it, you lose it.
So some will lead, while others follow.
Some will be warm, others cold
Some will be strong, others weak.
Some will get where they are going
While others fall by the side of the road.
So the sage will be neither wasteful nor violent.
[133, verse 29]
5.1 Summary and Contributions
In this thesis, we have introduced the new paradigm of world libraries. After
motivating the need for a public library replacement in an age of greased
digital information and a short thesis overview in Section 1.1, we begin by
defining world libraries, as well as relating our definition to similar but dif-
ferent concepts, thus giving justification for both the necessity and the form
of our definition in Section 1.2. In Section 1.3, we defend the utility of world
libraries as we envision them on philosophical, economical, and legal grounds.
In particular, we suggest and provide rationale for a new approach targeted
at practical mass usability instead of privacy protection against very strong
adversaries. We argue that the lack of conceptual clarity and explicit motiva-
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tion might have contributed to the fact that no similar system has achieved
mass adoption for both technical and social reasons. Therefore, we are con-
vinced that the definition and motivation in this chapter provide a solid and
important foundation for further research.
Chapter 2 surveys existing file sharing networks that provide some kind
of privacy protection as world library forerunners or candidates. Unlike ear-
lier surveys, we are guided by the definitions and motivations from the in-
troductory chapter. Thus, we examine these systems with regard to their
usefulness for efficiently sharing large data volumes in open untrusted envi-
ronments while preserving privacy. Key aspects here include potential rea-
sons for failing to attain mass usage, potential or demonstrated attacks, and
best practices. Ant routing based systems have been singled out as the hith-
erto most important category of anonymous file sharing networks. In Sec-
tion 2.1 we introduce their general principles, compare several instantiations,
and identify common weaknesses in both efficiency and privacy protection.
This leads us to the conclusion that unstructured networks display severe
deficiencies in both categories. In accordance with a general trend in mas-
sively distributed systems we therefore discourage their use for world library
implementations. After briefly looking at miscellaneous networks for com-
pleteness in Section 2.2, we have conducted a case study on the Owner-Free
File System, a very unorthodox approach employing a structured peer-to-
peer system. We find that this system’s design goals resemble our motives
and prefigure our definitions in no small part, and that its general architec-
ture might be suited well to achieve these goals. Unfortunately, OFF has
not yet attained great popularity either. Section 2.3 asks for potential rea-
sons. Through experiments both in the live network and a larger artificial
PlanetLab network we examine attacks on the privacy of OFF users and look
for efficiency pitfalls. Our findings suggest that both privacy and efficiency
hazards could be mitigated in a larger network. However, it seems very dif-
ficult to predict how the system would perform when deployed on a great
number of nodes. This is because its complexity and proprietary nature hin-
der simulation and analysis, and experiments become very expensive beyond
the scale of PlanetLab. This leads us to conclude that in order to reliably
construct world libraries it is essential to build these massively distributed
systems from simple structures whose efficiency and security can be proven
by analysis or simulation.
Our survey and case study in Chapter 2 suggest that DHTs are a good
candidate for the most important among such structures. That is why we
devote Chapter 3 to the study of their properties with regard to the require-
ments we have so far identified for usage in world libraries. Following an
introduction of our DHT and attacker models (Section 3.1), earlier research
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on DHT security is surveyed in Section 3.2 to place our work in context. We
differ from the majority of authors in this area in that we focus strongly on
the avoidance of active eclipse attacks because most other attacks, includ-
ing information leakage, are unnecessary for an adversary once he is able
to successfully mislead DHT lookups. This insight informs our discussion
of DHT privacy and security. It has far-reaching implications, such as the
preference of iterative routing over recursive routing. We begin our analy-
sis in Section 3.3 by showing that previous approaches that try to achieve
redundancy through independent paths cannot guarantee security when the
networks grow arbitrarily large. We identify an alternative approach found
in the Kademlia DHT that we term aggregated greedy search, and go on
to prove a similar yet more involved result: Aggregated greedy search with-
out further protection measures also falls prey to eclipse attacks w.h.p. at
least asymptotically. However, by hiding the search value and introduc-
ing finger table bounds checking for the entire search process we achieve
strong protection against active attacks, as documented by our simulation
results. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first known practical ap-
proach to DHTs that scalably defends against the eclipse attack. Building
on this secure framework, Section 3.4 examines information leakage in DHT
lookups. While acknowledging that the efficiency and security of redundant
DHT lookups necessarily carries the burden of increased exposure to eaves-
droppers, we propose several measures that harden our approach against
passive attacks. While perfect privacy appears unachievable here, we show
that the degree of practical privacy heavily depends upon the application.
In Section 3.5 we discuss network bootstrapping and maintenance, study the
effects of a stronger attacker model, and show that aggregated greedy search
is asymptotically optimal with regard to path length in a general setting.
Finally, we summarize our findings in Section 3.6.
Chapter 4 contains a theoretical analysis that has serious consequences
for the design of privacy enhancing technologies: we prove limits for the
number of rounds that any anonymity technique adhering to a very general
model can disguise communication relationships. In Section 4.1 we introduce
and motivate our model, as well as putting our contributions in the context
of related work. In Section 4.2 we derive a lower bound on the probability
that after a given number of observations a unique hitting set exists, which
theoretically allows for deanonymization, as discovered in earlier work. The
number of observations required for this attack to succeed w.h.p. is surpris-
ingly low, yet it requires actually finding the unique hitting set which is an
NP hard problem. Therefore, computational intractability might still pro-
tect anonymity techniques at this point. However, in Section 4.3 a simple
learning algorithm is employed to solve this problem in linear time, albeit
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this requires a specific problem structure that is likely to arise only after a
much larger number of observations. In Section 4.4 we present a slightly
more involved learning algorithm that is able to prove correct its hypothe-
sis, but needs an even higher expected number of observations. Although
there have been some earlier results in this line of research, to the best of our
knowledge we provide the first analytical lower bound for the probability that
an adversary can prove its hypothesis on the set of communication partners
correct in a general model like this. In the context of this thesis, our findings
suggest two general principles for the implementation of world libraries and
other PETs: First, no anonymity technique is able to hide communication
relationships forever. Second, basing privacy or security on the intractability
of some computational problem requires close scrutiny because the concrete
instances arising in the application might actually turn out to be efficiently
solvable, a point we elaborate on in our concluding remarks in Section 4.5.
5.2 Requirements, Issues, Principles, and
Ideas for World Libraries
In this section we discuss the implications of our results and other observa-
tions on the design of future world libraries in the spirit of software engineer-
ing practices like Issue-based Modeling [45]. To begin with, in Chapter 1 we
saw that it is of utmost importance to clearly state the purpose and motiva-
tion of a world library system. This is because there has been much confusion
about the legality, social desirability, and overall purpose of similar systems,
which in turn has endangered their popularity, and thereby, usefulness. This
process of clarification has enabled us to introduce a well-defined concept
of world libraries. Elaboration of our definition, in turn, yields a list of re-
quirements. For a concrete system, the list of requirements may be directly
derived from our explanation in Section 1.2.
In addition to the requirements, we have identified a number of issues
that should guide system design:
1. As shown in Chapter 2, unstructured networks exhibit problematic
and unpredictable behavior in both performance and security. In ac-
cordance with a general trend in peer-to-peer computing, we therefore
recommend their replacement with structured systems.
2. Chapter 2 also suggests that the problems inherent in proprietary, com-
plex, and monolithic designs are aggravated in (massively) distributed
systems. This is because the behavior of such systems is very hard
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to predict under the realities of growing and heterogeneous networks.
Thereby, world libraries should be constructed out of simple, well-
understood, and standardized components.
3. In Chapter 3 we have discovered that in order to guard a system’s per-
formance and privacy against realistic adversaries, it is both necessary
and possible to protect its DHTs from eclipse attacks. We refer to that
chapter for specific measures.
4. While earlier scholarship [86] discovered that there is a trade-off be-
tween protection against active and passive attacks, we maintain that
there can be no protection against eavesdropping without effective pro-
tection against eclipse attacks. In light of our analysis in Chapter 3,
it follows that our means of defending against information leakage are
limited in practical applications. This is consistent with our goal of
privacy protection against limited strength adversaries that we argued
for in Section 1.3.2, and suggests that relying on the impossiblity to
link users and requested data items endangers privacy.
5. Chapter 3 further implies that responder anonymity is hard to uphold
under the conditions outlined in the previous two points. Together with
the last point, this is another argument against storing incriminating
data on nodes.
6. The results from Chapter 4 make clear that any enduring communica-
tion relationship can eventually be discovered. The model is general
enough to also cover relationships between nodes and data items. This
means that we need to avoid long lasting links (for example for trans-
ferring large files) between peers, as well as repeated access to possibly
incriminating data stored on nodes.
Looking at these issues, it might appear impossible to design a world
library according to our definition. And indeed we do not believe that an ef-
ficient practical system that guarantees perfect privacy can be built using to-
day’s technology. However, our analysis of the OFF System (see Section 2.3)
provides evidence that a world library that preserves practical privacy could
be achieved. In fact, OFF’s design incorporates elements that mitigate most
issues we have found. In particular, its key idea of owner-free, meaningless,
or multi-use data blocks is very helpful in that linking an action such as
storing, sending, or receiving a block to a user leaks little or no information
about that user’s intentions to an eavesdropper. We have seen that although
patterns are still observable, in a growing network it becomes very hard to
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reliably infer user behavior. While OFF has not yet succeeded as a world
library, we believe that this can be mainly attributed to its neglect of the
second issue mentioned above. Our experiments suggest that OFF’s per-
formance and security problems could be reduced if only the network were
larger. However, it is not at all clear how the ad hoc DHT built into OFF
would behave if many nodes were to join. To summarize, we believe that the
general idea of distributing meaning over many nodes is a key technique in
the realization of world libraries. Secondly, we strongly recommend the use
of simple structured networks with well-researched performance and security
properties. Furthermore, communication between nodes should be encrypted
using standard technologies in order to deter local adversaries. Finally, best
practices from general software engineering, user interface design, and eco-
nomics should be used in the design and implementation of world libraries,
but are beyond the scope of this thesis.
5.3 Outlook and Future Work
Building world libraries may at first glance seem like a simple engineering
task. In this thesis, we have collected evidence that this is not the case. In
fact, many previous attempts at constructing anonymous file sharing net-
works have failed. We have argued that the difficulties are manifold: They
begin with failing to properly argue what should be built and why. We hope
to have given some answers to these questions. Still it appears that we have
just begun a new line of research: Massively distributed systems are far from
well understood, especially with regard to security and privacy. The few
solutions that we know of often severely impact efficiency. Yet, with their
focus on large data volumes, world libraries require high levels of efficiency
at the same time as privacy, if they are to succeed. In light of results like
our bounds on anonymity, it might well be that perfect privacy in massively
distributed systems that share large data volumes is impossible. We see a
clear need for further theoretical research in this direction. Even if such up-
per bound theorems existed, they would not imply that a practical trade-off
cannot be found. Our research on the OFF System, as well as our findings
on DHT protection, inspire us with hope that a combination of new ideas
and basic research can help achieve the goal of practical world libraries.
We found that our use of methods as well as collaboration with researchers
from both practical and theoretical computer science has lead to fruitful re-
sults that could not have been achieved by one or the other alone. A great
number of future research opportunities in this spirit has been outlined in the
more technical chapters. And while it has been said that “It is insufficient
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to protect ourselves with laws; we need to protect ourselves with mathemat-
ics.” [143], we have to contend that the reverse is true as well. Building world
libraries appears to require much more basic research, by computer scientists
as well as scholars of law, philosophy, economics, sociology and psychology,
before we can leave it to the engineers.
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